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Let not young souls be smothered out before
They do quaint deeds and fully flaunt their pride.
It is the world's one crime its babes grow dull,
Its poor are oxike, limp and leaden-eyed.
Not that they starve, but starve so dreamlessly;
Not that they sow, but'that they seldom reap;
Not that they serve, but have no gods to serve;
Not that they die, but that they die like sheep.
"The Leaden-Eyed"
Vachel Lindsay
I. INTRODUCTION
Many activities for young people are made possible only by the willingness
of volunteers to give freely of their time and energy. The pool of volunteers is
jeopardized by the threat, both actual and perceived, of tort liability. One effort
to assuage this threat has been to use exculpatory agreements. Exculpatory
agreements, also called "releases" or "waivers," are basically written
documents in which one party agrees to release, or "exculpate," another from
potential tort liability for future conduct covered in the agreement. Although
exculpatory agreements are contracts in form, they are also sometimes
categorized and addressed in torts terms as expressions of express assumption
* See infra note 2.
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of risk.' Indeed, the multifaceted analytical personality of exculpatory
agreements may help to explain the hostile reception they have received in the
courts when asserted in defense of torts claims based on injuries to minors. I
believe the time has come to reevaluate the question of the validity of such
exculpatory agreements in the setting of volunteer liability in youth activities.
Although courts, as a general matter, recognize the validity of exculpatory
agreements, they have significantly retreated from that general rule by creating
an array of exceptions. Several of these exceptions have been relevant, or even
outcome determinative, in the context of exculpatory agreements executed on
behalf of minors participating in youth activities. A majority of courts that have
addressed the question have held not only that minors lack the capacity to enter
into valid exculpatory agreements, but also that parents may not bind their
minor children by executing such agreements on their behalf. Moreover, even
when an exculpatory agreement is otherwise generally valid, as when an adult
executes one on his or her own behalf, most courts have held that such
agreements may not preclude liability for more extreme forms of negligence
such as recklessness or gross negligence. The thesis of my article is that
exculpatory agreements executed by a parent or guardian on behalf of minors
(and with the concurrence of mature minors) should be valid when releasing
volunteers and sponsoring entities providing youth services on a nonprofit
basis, and should preclude their tort liability for all unintentional injuries.
Ideally, this result should be achieved by state statutes. In the absence of such
legislation, however, I urge the courts to uphold the validity of these
agreements.
My concern here is the well-being of America's young people. This may
strike one as an oxymoron. How, one might ask, will removal of the minors'
right to recover in tort, by upholding the validity of exculpatory agreements,
advance the interests of minors? The answer is twofold. First, the choice is
really not between youth activities with a right to sue and youth activities
without such a right. Rather, the choice for many may be between youth
activities without a right to sue and no organized youth activities at all. Second,
the right to sue in tort not only may not advance the interests tort law is
supposed to serve, it may in fact undercut those interests.
If trends are not reversed, the alternative for many young people will be no
supervised youth activities and greatly reduced opportunities for meaningful
contact with caring adults. What organized activities remain will become so
unspontaneous and entombed with illusory, defense-motivated "safeguards"
that they will end up simply frustrating young participants. Impounded day-care
I See RESTATEMErNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B & cmt. a (1965) (contracts by
which one expressly agrees to accept a risk classified as "express assumption of risk" and
"noncontractual consent"); W. PAGE KEErON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 482-84 (5th ed. 1984) (defense addressed in context of assumption
of risk).
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and latchkey children will be largely confined to a passive world of vicarious
experiences. "NerfP" tiddlywinks2 will become the guiding paradigm.
I believe that there are compelling reasons for permitting parents or
guardians to enter into valid exculpatory agreements on behalf of minors. In
any broadly conceived balancing of costs and benefits, the full effects of the
threat of liability, especially under the present unpredictable tort system, must
be weighed against the potential benefits. Because the willingness of volunteers
to participate in organized youth activities is clearly affected by the threat of
liability, both actual and perceived, one enormous cost of tort liability is to
place in jeopardy the legion of vdlunteers that run most organized youth
activities. Moreover, the quality of the relationships between the participants,
their families, and the volunteers in these activities is undermined by the threat
of tort claims. For volunteers, when the willingness to participate is so elastic,
the choice is not between careful and careless volunteers. It is between
protected volunteers and no volunteers at all.
In addition to the danger of driving most volunteers out of youth activities
by the threat of tort litigation and liability, there are other convincing
arguments for upholding the validity of exculpatory agreements. When
evaluated objectively, I believe that the supposed benefits of tort liability are
outweighed by the costs, and that such liability is counterproductive when
imposed on volunteers in organized youth activities. All too frequently the
analysis of this question has been conceptually myopic. Too often the costs and
benefits of tort liability have focused narrowly and exclusively on the interests
of the immediate victim-what it would have taken or cost in retrospect for this
volunteer to have prevented this injury to this victim, or what would it take to
compensate this victim. Should we not inquire more broadly? Does the
"deterrence" of tort liability, when applied to the entire class of these
participants, really reduce accidents any more than would be true if the
autonomy of the parties were respected by upholding exculpatory clauses? For
example, might the effective presence of such agreements encourage more
active and continuing parental involvement in the activity, with concomitant
reduction of accidents? Might not members of the legal profession better serve
our children by spending more time with them-not at depositions and
reviewing files, but on the playing field, at the parks, and in the wilderness
areas?
Furthermore, are the goals of "compensation" and loss allocation best
served by a system that returns such a small percentage of each insurance dollar
spent to the victim, that overcompensates some and undercompensates others,
that rewards fraud, fabrication, and malingering, and that compensates only
those victims whose injury can be traced to tortious conduct by an insured or
2 The metaphor of the "neriP" tiddlywinks comes from one of my former students,
Patricia F. Nicely.
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wealthy actor, ignoring the plight of the rest? Would not first-party health and
disability insurance offer a manifestly better return? Do the erratic outcomes
under the tort system really allocate losses in a way* that sends the desired
signal about the true costs of various competing activities? Or, is the message
one of desultory and unpredictable litigation horror stories that do little more
than terrorize potential volunteers into flight?
What of fairness? It is only by sheer coincidence that the amount of
liability imposed in a particular case accurately reflects the amount needed to
compensate (assuming that money can ever compensate), deter, and punish
appropriately. Do volunteers who may be found by a jury in retrospect to have
unintentionally contributed to a youth's injury really deserve the harsh
badgering and financial bloodletting of the torts system?
I have the following objectives in this article. First, I will examine the need
for volunteers in organized activities for our young people. Second, I will
discuss the potential for negligence liability of such volunteers in the absence of
a valid exculpatory agreement. Third, I will survey the judicial attitudes toward
exculpatory agreements in this setting. And finally, I will set forth my proposal
calling for a statutory authorization of such agreements.
II. NEED FOR VOLUNTEERS
The United States is burdened by an unimaginable debt.3 It is unthinkable
that we could afford to pay for the services currently provided by volunteers.4
More than 85 million Americans engage in volunteer activities. 5 These
volunteers spend an average of 5 hours a week on volunteer projects, and
provide 16.5 billion hours of volunteer services each year. 6 It is clear from
3 Even under the optimistic estimates for a booming economic recovery, the 1992
deficit is still projected to be $315 billion. Dan Morgan & Walter Pincus, You 77Tink the
Budget Is Solved?, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 18, 1990, at C5. The interest payment on the
debt for fiscal 1990 alone was $184 billion. Jonathan Marshall, Bush's Rosy Outlook on
Budget Draws Skeptics, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1991, at C1.
4 At last estimate two years ago, the services to the Nation provided by volunteers each
year were valued in excess of $110 billion. 136 CONG. REC. H7521-02 (daily ed. Sept. 13,
1990) (statement of Rep. Porter).
5 Id.; see also, Ann Devroy, National Volunteer Week Celebrates a Bush
Adninistration Centerpiece, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 12, 1989, at A21. Other estimates
are that 48% of Americans engage in some sort of volunteer activity. Olive Evans, Coping
with Volunteering, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1988, at 52. On the demographics of the
volunteer population, see Linda Spear, The Changing Role of Volunteers, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1982, at 8.
6 136 CONG. REC. H7521-02 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Porter). In
1987, volunteers devoted 20 billion hours to volunteer activities. Devroy, supra note 5, at
A21.
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President Bush's "thousand points of light" theme,7 that volunteer efforts
represent a high national priority. One wonders how our present way of life
could continue without such volunteer efforts. Considering that these services
are conservatively valued at $110 billion a year,8 it is clear that the government
could not afford to finance such services with current government revenues.
Nowhere is the need for volunteers more crucial than in programs and
activities for young people. I will not repaint here the Hogarthian picture of
today's American youth immersed in a troubled sea of child abuse,9 drugs, teen
pregnancies,10 suicide," sexually-transmitted diseases, crime, 12 and violence.13
Nor will I argue that volunteers constitute a universal solvent to these
problems. Volunteers cannot alone reconstitute disintegrating families in
America, 14 eliminate poverty, 15 sweep the streets of drugs16 and crime, or
7 Gregg Petersmeyer, the presidential assistant who heads the national service
operation, stated in an interview during National Volunteer Week that "[tihere are certain
problems that totally overwhelm the government's ability to deal with them: literacy, child
poverty, drugs, gangs, teen-age pregnancy." Devroy, supra note 5, at A21. He added that
these areas are "virtually out of control" and beyond the federal government's ability to
overcome even if its resources were multiplied several fold. Id.
8 136 CONG. REC. H7521-02 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Porter).
9 The incidence of child abuse and neglect has increased markedly over the past two
decades. See Michael S. Jellinek et al., Protecting Severely Abused and Neglected
Children-An Unkept Promise, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1628 (1990). There were 2.4
million reported cases of child abuse in 1989. Linda L. Creighton, The New Crphanages,
U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., Oct. 8, 1990, at 37. There are currently no estimates for
how many other children suffer such abuse anonymously. Id. Abuse and neglect of children
increased 74% in the last decade. J. Gans et al., America's Adolescents: How Healthy Are
7l -y?, (Vol. 1, AMA Profiles of Adolescent Health Services, 1990, at xi).
10 Every 67 seconds a teenager gives birth to a child. Nancy Gibbs, Shamefid Bequests
to the Next Generation, TIME, Oct. 8, 1990, at 42.
11 The suicide rate almost tripled for 10-14 year olds between 1968-85 (and doubled
for 15-19 year olds). Gans et al., supra note 9, at xi.
12 See Anastasia Toufexis, Our Violent Kids, TIME, June 12, 1989, at 52.
13 Id. Between 1968-85, the homicide rate among 10-14 year olds almost doubled.
Gans et al., supra note 9, at 39.
14 Today, single parents head 24% of families with children. Toufexis, supra note 12,
at 54. It has been estimated that by age 17, 70% of white children born in 1980 and 94% of
black children will have lived some part of their lives in one-parent homes. Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2938 n.24 (1990) (citing anicus curiae brief for American
Psychological Association, at 12-13 (1990) (citing Sandra L. Hofferth, Updating Cildren's
Life Course, 47 J. MARRIAGE AND FAM. 93 (1985))).
15 It has been estimated that one out of every five children in the United States lives in
poverty. Toufexis, supra note 12, at 54.
16 Although the teenage population declined by two percent in a recent five year
period (1983-87), arrests of juveniles for drug abuse violations increased by five percent.
Id.
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become the primary educators of our youth 17 and inculcators of moral values.18
I am convinced, however, that they do help. A root cause of violent youths
(and by extension, violent adults) is abuse by parents and the lack of parental
nurturing, guidance, and supervision.1 9 Youth recreational activities can begin
to fill the growing void in the lives of many young people. Positive habits can
be developed and reinforced, self-esteem enhanced, and emulation of suitable
role models encouraged.
Organized youth athletics and other activities offer a respite from television
and various sources of media violence that have been tied to youth violence20
as well as to other adverse behavioral and psychological effects. 21 Television is
often the substitute for other activities. One leading expert observed that
television, by revealing the secrets of adulthood so early and intensively, has
destroyed the phenomenon of childhood as a discrete and bountiful period of
innocence.22
By all accounts, the physical health of American children is also declining.
Health columnist Jane Brody recently commented that "the youth of America
are going to seed." 23 In the last decade, performance by youngsters in
recognized components of fitness declined dramatically. 24 Even among 5 and
6-year-olds, significant variations in blood pressure were found to be a function
of differences in aerobic fitness and body fatness,25 both of which have a
17 It is estimated that more than 25% of teenagers drop out of high school. Id.
18 In one recent survey, 25% of those participating would abandon their family and 7
percent would kill a stranger for $10 million. See Morality in America-7% of Make-Own-
Rules Americans Would Kill for $10 Million, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, April 29, 1991,
at Al. The article was based on findings of a recent book. See James Patterson & Peter
Kim, THE DAY AMERICA TOLD THE TRUTH (1991).
19 See Toufexis, supra note 12, at 55, 57. In one recent survey, more people (72% of
those polled) identified lack of parental supervision as one of the main factors than they did
any other factor. Id. Harvard psychiatrist Robert Coles warns that "[c]hildren who go
unheeded... are children who are going to turn on the world that neglected them." Gibbs,
supra note 10, at 43.
20 See Toufexis, supra note 12, at 55, 57. By the age of 16, it is estimated that a
typical child has witnessed 200,000 acts of violence in the entertainment and other media.
Id. at 55.
21 Id. at 55, 57. Richard Zoglin, Is TV Ruining Our Children?, TIME, Oct. 15, 1990,
at 76.
22 Id. at 76 (based on interview with Professor Neil Postman).
23 Jane Brody, How to Keep Children Physically Fit, KNOXVILLE NEwS-SENTINEL,
May 28, 1990, atB1.
24 Id. Youngsters able to complete tasks measuring strength, flexibility, and endurance
capabilities declined from 43 to 32%. Id.
25 See Bernard Gartin et al., Blood Pressure, Fitness, and Fatness in 5- and 6-Year-
Old Children, 264 J.A.M.A. 1123, 1126 (1990).
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substantial impact on current and future cardiovascular health. 26 The
connection between sedentary lifestyle and coronary heart disease is well
established.27 And coronary heart disease accounts for more than a quarter of
all deaths each year in the United States. 28 Another recent study has pointed to
a strong correlation between television watching29 and an alarming rise in
childhood and adolescent obesity. 30 Various factors influencing children's
participation in physical activity include not only the level of parental
involvement and access to television, but also the availability of stimulating
physical activities.31
Assuming that there is a growing need for volunteers, one must consider
the effects of potential tort liability on the availability and quality of volunteer
services. The most obvious effect has been to discourage many volunteers from
undertaking or continuing volunteer services. 32 A majority of 8,000 executives
of volunteer associations surveyed recently indicated that fear of liability
exposure and of litigation in general is damaging their efforts at volunteer
recruitment. 33 Although the number of lawsuits against volunteers is difficult to
quantify, the publicity of such cases has nevertheless had a significant impact. 34
To compound matters, the cost of liability insurance for volunteers has been
prohibitive, and is often simply not obtainable. 35
26 Id. at 1127.
27 See Perspective in Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Coronary Heart
Disease Attributable to Sedentary Lifestyle-Selected States, 1988, 39 MoRBIDrrY &
MORTALTY WKLY. REP. 541 (1990). Sedentary lifestyle is the most prevalent (58%),
modifiable risk factor for coronary heart disease. Id. Coronary heart disease could be
significantly reduced if the United States population became more physically active. Id. The
estimated number of deaths attributable to coronary heart disease that could have been
prevented had this risk factor not been present were 22,225 in New York in 1988 alone. Id.
at 542-43.
28 Id. at 541.
29 By some accounts, the average child will have watched 5,000 hours of television by
the time he enters first grade and 19,000 hours by the time he finishes high school. Zoglin,
supra note 21, at 75.
30 See In Brief, KNOxvILE NEws-SENTiNEL, Sept. 10, 1990, at B1.
31 Id. at B1, B2.
32 See Lisa Green Markoff, A Volunteer's 77tankless Task, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 19, 1988,
at 1, 40; End the Liability of Volunteering, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 1986, (Perspective), at 2.
About half of the nonprofit organizations participating in a 1988 Gallup poll reported a drop
in their volunteer rosters in the past few years. Sixteen percent of the officers reported
curtailing their own activities because of liability fears. Markoff, supra at 40.
33 See 136 CONG. REC. H7521-02 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Porter, reporting on the results of a 1986 survey).
3 4 See Markoff, supra note 32, at 40.
35 See End the Liability of Volunteering, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 1986, (Perspective), at
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The threat of liability has also affected the availability of services in other
ways. 36 'The threat of liability of volunteers has greatly increased the costs of
participating in various youth activities even though they are often sponsored
by nonprofit organizations. Recent reports have indicated that liability
insurance costs for primary sponsoring organizations have increased
dramatically in recent years, 37 forcing the cessation 38 or curtailment of services
in many instances.39 If liability insurance is provided to cover the individual
liability of volunteers, the costs often reach the prohibitive stage. Conversely,
the failure to offer such individual insurance coverage to volunteers may further
inhibit their willingness to serve, 40 thus exacerbating the effects of the threat of
36 See Marcia Chambers, Whatever Happened to the Sandlot?, NAT'L L.'., Apr. 22,
1991, at 15 ("Youth sports activities are slowly becoming extinct-from fear of lawsuits.").
37 See Letter to the Editor by James K. Coyne, President of American Tort Reform
Association, WASINGTON POST, Aug. 11, 1986, at A14. The liability insurance premium
for the Boy Scouts increased from $2 million to $10 million in 1986. Id. Little League
teams have also experienced increases in insurance premiums. One team, for example,
reported an increase from $75 to $795 in the last eight years. Editorial, Little League Bill Is
Irresistible But Stortsighted, NEWSDAY, May 6, 1989, at 18.
38 See, e.g., Robert Hanley, Insurance Costs Imperil Recreation Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 1986, at Al. For example, Little League baseball for 900 youths was
stopped because the local Little League could not obtain the $25 million in insurance
coverage required by the lessor of the playing field. Id.
39 It is not clear from reports of insurance exactly who is covered by liability insurance
maintained by sponsors of these activities. It is unclear whether the insurance covers only
the primary sponsoring entity itself for its potential direct and vicarious liability, or whether
it also covers its employees and its volunteers with respect to their potential individual
liability. Nor is it clear whether it covers entities and individuals at the local as well as
national level of such primary sponsoring organizations. A question also exists whether
there is liability insurance coverage for secondary sponsors and its employees and
volunteers. Apparently the national Boy Scout organization has provided some liability
insurance for secondary scouting sponsors. See Veronica T. Jennings, PTA's Wary of Scout
Sponsorships; Area Groups Fear Liability in Wake of Molestation Verdict, WASHINGTON
PoST, Apr. 2, 1989, at B1. It is unclear whether this coverage covers individual employees
and volunteers of such secondary sponsors.
40 It would appear that few primary sponsors of youth activities adequately inform
their volunteers of their status with respect to liability insurance. Thus, vague references by
word of mouth that there is "insurance" should not be very reassuring. Insurance covering
whom? The fact that an organization is itself covered does not, of course, afford any
protection for individual volunteers. Even if "employees" are also covered, any insurance
protection of volunteers would depend on whether such volunteers were deemed
"employees" or were otherwise covered under the terms of the insurance policy.
The Nonprofit Sector Risk Management Task Force recommends that nonprofit
organizations either agree to indemnify their volunteers for liability or provide liability
insurance protection for their volunteers. See Kari Berman, Risk Management 7Tps Pitched
to Nonprofits, BUsINESS INSURANCE, July 10, 1989, at 44. Many organizations have
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liability. In any event, the cumulative effect of the threat of liability on
recreation is "devastating." 41 As one writer notes, we have not simply reached
the point where it is more expensive to enjoy life, "but where activities bearing
any risk are being removed from the market." 42 For those individuals and
organizations not completely discouraged from participating in youth activities,
the threat of liability often inhibits the range of experiences offered. Thus, for
example, organizations report reducing the kind of activities for children from
horseback riding to book fairs.43
The threat of liability not only discourages volunteers and primary
sponsoring organizations from undertaking direct involvement with youth
activities, but it may also discourage organizations and individuals from
indirect involvement, such as serving as secondary sponsors44 of youth
activities. For example, at one time it was common practice for local
organizations, such as schools, PTA's, churches, and civic clubs to screen,
select, and approve local Boy Scout leaders. 45 However, concern over potential
liability for such screening activities has apparently discouraged many of these
organizations and individuals from undertaking such activities. 4 6
apparently had difficulty not merely in affording liability insurance for their volunteers, but
in obtaining coverage for them at any cost. See End the Liability of Volunteering, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 24, 1986, (Perspective), at 2.
41 Chambers, supra note 36, at 16.
42 Id.
43 Markoff, supra note 32, at 40.
44 For the purpose of this article, primary sponsors refers to entities directly associated
with the activity. Examples include the Boy Scouts of America and the Little League.
Primary sponsors often will have two or more levels of involvement, such as a national
organization and local entities. Secondary sponsors consist of organizations that provide
some form of support to the primary entities. Examples include the role of PTA's and
schools in sponsoring local Boy Scout troops. See infi'a notes 45-46.
45 See Jennings, supra note 39, at Bi. There were, at least until recently, 1.4 million
boys in scout troops sponsored by local PTA's and schools. Churches and community
groups sponsored 2.3 million other scouts in 100,000 troops nationwide. Id.
46 See Jennifer Kerr, National PTA, Scouts Fetd Over Picking Troop Leaders, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1989, at A3; Jennings, supra note 39, at B1. In a recent case, a VFW post
and a volunteer fire department were, along with others, named as defendants in a case
involving the alleged sexual molestation of two boys by a person who served as assistant
scoutmaster and scoutmaster of a Boy Scout troop in which the boys were members. The
VFW and fire department were the local secondary sponsors of the troops. See L.P. v.
Oubre, 547 So. 2d 1320 (La. Ct. App.) (addressing the trial court's resolution of motions to
strike made by some defendants), writ denied, 550 So. 2d 634 (La. 1989). Apparently the
allegations of negligence against these latter defendants related to a failure to take
reasonable steps to assure that the scoutmaster in question was not a threat to the young
troop members.
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III. POTENTIAL TORT LIABILITY OF VOLUNTEERS
A. Negligence Liability and the Standard of Care
The first reaction of a volunteer upon being sued is often incredulity: "I
can't be sued-I'm only a volunteer." The mere fact, however, that a person is
acting in a volunteer capacity does not preclude the imposition of tort liability.
A duty of care does not require a compensated relationship. Merely
undertaking to perform services, even if they are gratuitous, is sufficient to
support the creation of a duty of care. 47 As one court noted, a defendant
"cannot escape a duty of ordinary care simply because he is a volunteer,
particularly where the welfare of children is entrusted to him." 48
The standard of care for volunteer services is usually stated in terms of a
duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. 49 Although
conceptually the standard of care remains one of reasonable conduct even
though the services are gratuitous, a number of courts have elaborated
somewhat on the standard for gratuitous services. Thus, some courts have held
that the scope of the duty owed in a voluntary undertaking may be affected by
the extent of the undertaking.50 Other courts have noted that a person caring
for a child is not an insurer of the child's safety, 51 and thus is expected to be
reasonable but not expected to be prescient and foresee and guard against every
possible hazard.5 2 Despite these ostensible reassurances that volunteers may
47 See, e.g., Castro v. Chicago Park Dist., 533 N.E.2d 504, 508 (I1. App. Ct. 1988);
L.P. v. Oubre, 547 So. 2d 1320, 1324 (La. Ct. App. 1989); McGarr v. Baltimore Area
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 536 A.2d 728, 734 (Md. App.), cert. denied, 542 A.2d
844 (Md. 1988); Curran v. City of Marysville, 766 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Wash. App. 1989);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
48 Castro, 533 N.E.2d at 508.
4 9 Id.; McGarr, 536 A.2d at 734; Curran, 766 P.2d at 1145; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
50 Castro, 533 N.E.2d at 508; cf. Loosier v. Youth Baseball and Softball, Inc., 491
N.E.2d 933, 937 (M1. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that although volunteers involved in youth
baseball owed a duty to supervise players actively participating in the activity, there was no
duty "to supervise those same players at any hour of the day or night when they might
decide to sell a raffle ticket").
51 Castro, 533 N.E.2d at 508; Curran, 766 P.2d at 1145.
52 Curran, 766 P.2d at 1145. In Curran, the court of appeals upheld a summary
judgment for a grandfather who was alleged to have been negligent in briefly leaving
unattended his 10-year-old (nearly 1 1-year-old) granddaughter at a playground. Apparently
the child was injured when she attempted to hurdle a T-bar device. The device was intended
to be used for stretching leg muscles. The defendant-grandfather had allowed the plaintiff to
go to the exercise court while he and some others visited a garden approximately 25 yards
away. The court specifically held as a matter of law that there was insufficient evidence to
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only be held liable when they really are negligent and that, accordingly,
perfection is not required, the possibility of liability is still very real. A few
recent decisions from baseball and scouting provide useful illustrations.
In Castro v. Chicago Park Dist.,53 a child participating in Little League
baseball was injured by a foul ball. He was seated on the player's bench during
a game. He sued the Park District, where the games were played, alleging that
it negligently designed the baseball diamond because a large opening existed
between the end of the backstop fence and the beginning of another fence in
front of the player's bench. The Park District filed a third-party complaint
seeking contribution from the president of the local Little League and the team
manager. After settlement by the district and the team manager, the
contribution claim against the president went to trial. The trial court directed a
verdict for the president.
On appeal, the directed verdict in favor of the president was reversed. 54
The appellate court held that the claim should have been presented to the jury-
in other words, at the very least, reasonable minds could differ on the question
of whether the president was negligent. Thus, a jury question was presented
whether the president acted reasonably in promulgating rules, organizing the
league, selecting the playing field, supervising the operation of the league,55
and in failing to warn the players and coaches of the danger. 56 The court gave
reach the jury that defendant knew or should have known that the exercise court was
somehow dangerous.
53 533 N.E.2d 504 (11. App. Ct. 1988).
54 Id. at 509.
55 Id. at 508.
56 Id. Although the court did not specifically state that the failure to warn was one of
the negligence issues for the jury to decide, it clearly implied as much by stating that the
failure to warn was a finding upon which reasonable minds could differ. According to
testimony at trial, the president had taken it upon himself to rejuvenate the league after it
had been dormant for two years. He was not paid for his services. He apparently played a
dominant role formulating local rules for the league. None of the written rules directed
where on the bench the players were to sit. The president testified that he had instructed the
coaches to have the players sit away from the gap in the fence, but that he could not
remember whether this was before or after the accident. Id. at 506. One manager for one of
the teams testified that he did not recall the safety of the players being discussed during the
season meetings, and he did not remember all the safety rules in place then. Id. The
president apparently did know of the opening in the fence prior to the accident but did not
complain. He was not, however, at the field when the boy was injured. There was evidence
that the president controlled most of the league's administrative operations.
The plaintiff had no previous experience with organized baseball and had played in five
or six games. He testified that he had received no safety instructions and could not
remember if league rules were given to him. He did not remember anyone telling him to sit
back away from the open space. A teammate testified that he had received a set of written
safety instructions. He also said that the equipment for the game was usually kept in the
opening between the fences. Id.
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short shrift to the argument that the president was only a volunteer and that
liability might discourage people from volunteering. The court admonished:
"When children are entrusted to the care of an organization, it must act with
due care and caution for the safety of its participants. It cannot matter that the
persons running the organization are volunteers." 57
In McGarr v. Baltimore Area Council, Boy Scouts of America,5s an eleven-
year-old Boy Scout was injured when he fell over a small tree-shrouded
precipice during a camping excursion. He sued his troop scoutmaster. 59
According to plaintiff's testimony, he fell while searching for firewood which
his scoutmaster had allegedly instructed him to gather. 60 Apparently, he and
another scout had decided to explore the source of the sound of some running
water.61 He alleged that the scoutmaster was negligent because the area of the
accident was dangerous, and the defendant negligently failed to familiarize
himself with the area, warn plaintiff of the danger, or properly supervise him.
A directed verdict for the defendant-scoutmaster was reversed on appeal. In
finding sufficient facts to entitle the plaintiff to present his case to the jury, the
court emphasized that the defendant did not survey the area, had no
topographical map, and had not consulted anyone knowledgeable about the
immediate area. The court also emphasized the evidence that plaintiff was
untrained in outdoor scouting activities and had, according to plaintiff's
evidence, been instructed to gather firewood without any warnings. 62
The potential sources of injury to baseball players63 and other young
athletes, as well as to scouts and other participants in a wide range of youth
activities is nearly limitless. When the conduct of coaches and others directly
involved in the activity is evaluated in retrospect, it will often be only too easy
to imagine how the accident could have been averted. In Castro, all someone
had to do was to make the boy move behind the fence. What could be simpler?
Of course, the same could be said for virtually any injury. Could one argue,
for example, that youth baseball players should not have been permitted to get
57 Id. at 508.
58 536 A.2d 728 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 542 A.2d 844 (Md. 1988).
59 He also sued the area council of Boy Scouts, which owned the property on which
the accident occurred. Id. at 729.
60 Id. at 731. Testimony by another scout contradicted these facts. Id. at 731 n.1.
61 The slope of the terrain gradually grew more steep until it reached the "cliff,"
estimated to be 15 to 40 feet above a creek. Id. at 731.
62 Id. at 734-35.
63 Another case in New Jersey involved a Little League outfielder who suffered an eye
injury when he was struck in the face by a fly ball. He alleged that four of his volunteer
coaches were negligent in switching him from second base to the outfield without teaching
him how to shield his eyes from the sun. See Sports People; Little League Sdt, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1985, at B18. Apparently the case was settled for $25,000. See Markoff,
supra note 32, at 40.
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dust in their eyes; that the bats should have been checked for splinter hazards;
that an accident to a Boy Scout at camp would have been avoided if only he
had been told to tie his shoe, step over the broken glass, duck below the low
branch, or not kneel where poison ivy might be lurking?6 4 Recent opinions
suggest a willingness of judges to allow the juries to indulge in this kind of
visionary second-guessing. The threat of liability, or at least the unpredictable
nature of the liability landscape, could have a devastating effect on the highly
elastic.supply of potential volunteers.65
B. Factors Increasing Exposure of Volunteers
1. Litigiousness in General
A number of factors have contributed to an increase in the exposure of
volunteers to potential tort liability. One is the increase in tort litigation
generally. For a variety of reasons, 66 the last several decades have witnessed a
dramatic increase in tort claims.67 Many individuals and entities that have
borne the brunt of the avalanche of tort claims have had no choice but to press
on, trying to weather the storm. Doctors, motivated by a sense of professional
64 See, e.g., Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1971) (alleged
negligence of camp employees in failing to adequately supervise campers in order to
prevent camper from being struck in eye by fishing hook; opinion addressed only the issue
of charitable immunity).
65 For example, the McGarr court offered a number of possible steps that the
landowner might have taken to have prevented the plaintiffs fall over the precipice. "[Tlo
post no warning signs, to omit any mention of the danger to the scouts or even to the
scoutmaster, and to leave the precipice without a guardrail of some kind," were all
possibilities of negligence that the jury could find. 536 A.2d at 734. Although these remarks
related to the potential liability of the area council (as the land owner of the campsite) rather
than to the individual scoutmaster, they nevertheless illustrate the typical judicial attitude
toward the negligence issue in these cases. Must volunteers now assure that their hikers only
venture into "wilderness" areas equipped with guardrails? It is no wonder, then, that
potential volunteers might well consider this kind of volunteer work a legal mine field.
66 It is difficult to quantify the various factors contributing to the increase in tort
claims, especially because the increase is probably a result of the combined, perhaps
synergistic, effects of these factors. Those factors probably influencing the increase include
changes in the law, increases in the number of attorneys, and changes in public attitudes
toward death, disease, and entitlement generally.
67 See PETER W. HUBER, LiABmrry: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 9-10 (1988). The increase has been manifested in the number of tort
claims asserted, the number in which the plaintiff prevailed, and in the size of the awards.
Id. at 10. While the direct costs of the American tort system were about $68 billion in 1984,
less than five years later they were estimated at over $100 billion. See STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY wrrH PERSONAL INJURY LAW xvii (1989).
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dedication, economic interests, and no doubt some "functionlust," 68 usually
continue to practice despite the threat of liability. Product manufacturers are not
driven from the market until they are overwhelmed by liability or, perhaps,
until the threat of liability makes continuation of a product economically
unwarranted. Volunteers, while often dedicated, have more flexibility and thus
are potentially more readily inhibited by the threat of liability than those
engaged in business activities.
2. Limitations on Traditional Defenses
a. Consent and Intentional Torts
Developments involving a variety of legal concepts facilitate tort claims
against volunteers participating in youth activities. A number of traditional
defenses or limitations on liability have more limited effect when invoked
against claims by minor plaintiffs. The concept of consent that normally
precludes liability for intentional torts has a more limited application because
minors, at least immature minors, 69 are held legally incapable of consenting to
at least some types of potentially harmful or offensive contacts. 70 Although
parents may give valid consent to some conduct affecting their children, there
are limits. The conduct in question must have been within the scope of the
parental consent. And parental consent may in some circumstances violate
public policy and be ineffective. Thus, parents could probably not give valid
consent for a child to undergo contacts deemed (even with parental
acquiescence) impermissible. 71
Admittedly, not all contacts with minors that turn out to be harmful or
offensive will be actionable if the courts, as they should, also require that in
order for such contacts to be actionable they not only be nonconsensual but also
be of an impermissible nature. Nevertheless, limitations on the validity of
consent by minors renders one hurdle that plaintiffs must leap less imposing.
The present proposal would not, sanction exculpatory agreements for
intentional tortious injuries. Thus, potential liability for such torts would
68 This term, originating with Konrad Lorenz, means the "love of doing a thing," and
has been applied to the self-perpetuating nature of medical procedures and techniques. See
George Crile, Jr., The Surgeon's Dilemma, HARPERS, May 1975, at 38.
69 Minors capable of appreciating the nature, extent, and probable consequences of the
contemplated conduct have sometimes been held legally competent to give effective
consent, at least to some types of conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 892A, cmt. b (1979). This rule is sometimes referred to as the mature minor rule. See
Cardwell v. Bechtel, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987).
70 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 18, at 114-15.
71 Thus, for example, parental consent to sexual abuse of a minor child would
obviously be ineffective.
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remain notwithstanding attempts at exculpation. But, it is therefore important to
identify those truly intentional tortious injuries for which valid parental consent
would be invalid because the contacts in question were impermissible
irrespective of parental acquiescence. 72
b. Assumption of Risk, and Contributory and Comparative Negligence
Traditional defenses to negligence claims such as implied assumption of
risk73 and contributory negligence have undergone continuing erosion, often
72 See infra part VI.D. 1.
73 A limitation on liability somewhat similar to implied assumption of risk is based on a
rationale that because of the nature of the activity, the parties' roles and relationships and
the participants' assumed or supposed knowledge of the activity (although a few courts seem
to require proof of some actual knowledge of the risks), the defendant is sometimes held to
owe no duty or a decreased duty to afford plaintiff greater protection, and thus was not even
negligent. See generally Knight v. Jewett, No. S019021, 1992 WL 203943 (Cal. Aug. 24,
1992); KEETON E'r AL., supra note 1, § 68, at 481, 496-97. Although implied assumption
of risk is frequently incorporated into a comparative negligence scheme, most courts would
probably hold that a finding that a defendant violated no duty owed to a plaintiff precludes
liability completely even in a comparative negligence jurisdiction. See id. at 496-97.
Some courts apply a variation of the no-duty or limited-duty idea in connection with
some aspects of some recreational activities. Such courts sometimes hold, especially for
professional or experienced adult athletes or participants, that with respect to the risks
normally associated with the activity, the defendant (especially if a co-participant) owes no
duty to plaintiff other than to avoid intentionally or recklessly injuring him. See, e.g.,
Knight, supra; Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986) (applying rule to co-
participant professional athletes); Wertheim v. United States Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 540
N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. Div.), leave to appeal denied, 547 N.E.2d 101 (N.Y. 1989); JEFFREY
K. RIFFER, SPORTS AND RECREATnONAL INjuRiES § 9.03 at 114 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
This limited-duty principle would also, like assumption of risk, have less application with
respect to injuries to minors. Minors, especially immature ones, are less capable of
understanding and evaluating the risks of an activity than are adult participants (especially
professional athletes). When children are involved, a defendant supervising them would not
be justified in expecting as much responsibility for self-preservation as would be true for
adult-plaintiffs, and thus would owe the children a level of care commensurate with the
foreseeable risks. Thus, the duty owed has to be assessed in light of the role of each
defendant, as well as the background and experience of the participants. See Benitez v. New
York City Bd. of Edue., 541 N.E.2d 29, 33 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that even a nineteen-
year-old star high school football player was at least owed a duty of reasonable care to
protect him from "unassumed, concealed or unreasonable risks," but finding the duty
satisfied in the instant case); see also Parsi v. Harpursville Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 N.Y.S.2d
566 (App. Div. 1990) (jury question whether, under Benitez rule, defendant coaches were
negligent in supervising thirteen-year-old player struck by ball during girls' softball practice,
and in failing to provide protective equipment); supra part IlI.A.
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being subsumed into a general comparative negligence scheme.74 Moreover,
these defenses have been subject to important conceptual limitations in cases
involving minor plaintiffs. Implied assumption of risk requires subjective
knowledge and appreciation of the risks to be assumed. 75 Because minors often
have more limited capacity for comprehending the gravity of risks, the defense
of implied assumption of risk, even if retained as an independent defense,
would have much more limited effect in claims by minor plaintiffs. 76
Contributory and comparative negligence, ordinarily governed by an objective
reasonable adult standard, is modified in the case of minors, whose conduct is
(unless .an exception applies) evaluated in terms of the care expected of a
person of like age, intelligence, and experience.77 Thus, these defenses would
also have a more limited effect on claims by minors.
c. Statutes of Limitations
The statute of limitations is another defense that is often less outcome
determinative in cases by or on behalf of minor plaintiffs. Many state statutes
provide that the statute of limitations for various tort claims is suspended
during minority or at least until a specified minimum age, or may not expire
for minors before a specified age or period. 78
74 See Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in An Era of Tort Reform.
Decisionsfor Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 228, 284-94 (1990).
75 See KEEON Er AL., supra note 1, § 68, at 487. Age has been recognized by the
courts as a factor that may affect one's ability to know the risks. Id. § 68, at 487 & n.70.
The requirement that the plaintiff have assumed the risk voluntarily may also be more
difficult to establish in the case of a child. See Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Sch.
Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1205 (Pa. 1981) (questioning voluntariness of one's participation in
"jungle football" practice drill if such participation was expected of one wishing to play
football and one otherwise had a right to play on the high school football team).
76 Nor is it likely that parental action would be imputed to their minor children to
support a defense of implied assumption of risk. As noted, most courts have been reluctant
to allow parents to expressly assume (by exculpatory agreement) a risk for their children.
See infra notes 132-36. The courts have also held that contributory negligence cannot be
imputed from parents to children. See KE=TON Er AL., supra note 1, §74 at 531-32. Courts
would likely follow a similar rule for implied assumption of risk, especially because the
trend has been to merge both defenses into a comparative negligence scheme.
77 See, e.g., McGarr v. Baltimore Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 536 A.2d
728, 732 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) cert. denied, 542 A.2d 844 (Md. 1988); KE=TON Er AL.,
supra note 1, at 179-82 (discussing rule for minors and the adult-activity exception).
78 See generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D, Limitations ofActions § 182 (1970); Jean E. Maess,
Annotation, Tolling of State Statute of Limitations in Favor of One Commencing Action
Despite Existing Disability, 30 A.L.R.4TH 1092 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
Most courts, however, do not apply such tolling provisions to parents' claims,
including claims for loss of the child's services and for the child's medical expenses, in
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3. Obstacles to Claims Against Other Defendants
Claims against volunteers engaged in youth activities may also sometimes
be inspired by the fact that claims against others whose negligence may also
have contributed to plaintiff's injury are sometimes precluded or complicated
by various rules. The availability of other potential defendants does not, of
course, preclude a claim against an individual volunteer whose negligence may
also have been a contributing cause79 of the injury and who may therefore be
subject to liability. But, the opportunity or lack of opportunity to recover from
other potential defendants may, as a practical matter, affect the potential
liability of individual volunteers. The availability of another potential
defendant, especially an insured or solvent "deep pocket," may prompt a
plaintiff to forego a claim against the volunteer. Or, the amounts paid by
another defendant may completely satisfy a judgment or claim,80 or at least
reduce the amount of possible recovery from the individual volunteer.81 Thus,
to the extent that various rules preclude or limit claims against other potential
tortfeasors, plaintiffs' attention would be expected to shift accordingly to
individual volunteers.
A number of doctrines could narrow the potential liability of some other
tortfeasors involved in injuries to minors. Claims against a child's parents may
connection with the child's injury, although there is a split of authority. See John H.
Derrick, Annotation, Tolling of Statute of Linitations, on Account of Minority of Injured
Child, As Applicable to Parent's or Guardian's Right of Action Arising Out of Sane Injury,
49 A.L.R.4TH 216 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
79 It is black letter law that an injury may have more than one tortious liability-
producing cause. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 & cmt. d (1965).
80 See generally KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, § 48, at 331. In such circumstances,
however, the defendant-volunteer may be subject to a claim from the other defendant for
contribution (if joint and several liability is applicable in the jurisdiction in question) or,
under some circumstances, indemnity. See generally KEErON Er AL., supra note 1, § 50, at
336-45; Mutter, supra note 74, at 303-19.
81 This reduction may occur in most of the states retaining joint and several liability
where one joint tortfeasor has or is deemed to have paid a part of a plaintiff's loss, and in
states that have modified or abandoned joint and several liability where a defendant's
liability may be limited (often based on relative fault) to a share of the total loss (or by some
variation of this rule). See generally 2 ARTHUR BEST, COMPARIrIVE NEGLIGENCE
§§ 13.00-13.90 (1992); KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, §§ 48, 49, 67, at 331-36, 475. The
effect of immunities of some tortfeasors (see infi'a notes 82-84) on the liability of remaining
tortfeasors (defendants) may depend on whether the immune conduct is considered in
calculating the remaining tortfeasor's liability. See BEST, supra § 13.20.
Furthermore, one tortfeasor may have a claim for contribution (usually pursuant to
statute) against another where joint and several liability is retained, or perhaps indemnity.
See supra note 80.
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be precluded by the doctrine of parental immunity in those jurisdictions that
have retained the immunity.82 Even if such claims are technically not
foreclosed, the absence of liability insurance or its exclusion from coverage
under some insurance policies83 may, as a practical matter, discourage claims
by children against their parents.
Tort claims against institutional sponsors of the activity may sometimes be
precluded by the doctrine of charitable immunity, although this defense has
been abrogated or significantly limited in many states.84 The fact that an
institutional sponsor may be protected from vicarious liability by some form of
charitable immunity does not in and of itself protect individual employees or
volunteers who may have caused the injury in question.85
Many injuries to minors are caused in part by dangerous conditions on the
land where the activity was taking place. The owner of the land is sometimes
protected from tort liability to varying degrees by recreational use statues. 86
82 See generally Kevin Fularczyk, Comment, Parent-Child Immunity After Carey v.
Meijer, Inc., 35 WAYNE L. REv. 153 (1988). There is a marked division of authority on
the issue of parental immunity. See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent
for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6
A.L.R.4TH 1066 (1981 & Supp. 1990); see also Andrea G. Nadel, Right of Tortfeasor to
Contribution from Joint Torfeasor Who -is Spouse or Otherwise in Cose Familial
Relationship to Injured Party, 25 A.L.R.4TH 1120, §§ 5-6 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
83 Some automobile liability insurance policies and liability provisions of homeowners
policies contain exclusions from coverage for claims made by various classes of persons,
such as other insureds under the policy and family members, for example. See generally
ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 382-85 (1988); Jonathan M.
Purver, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application of Provision of Automobile
Liability Policy of Insured Excluding From Coverage Injury or Death of Member of Family
or Household, 46 A.L.R.3D 1024 (1972 & Supp. 1990).
84 See generally Note, The Quality of Mercy: "Charitable Torts" and 77teir Continuing
Immunity, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1987); Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity of
Nongovernmental Charities-Modern Status, 25 A.L.R.4TH 517 (1983 & Supp. 1990).
85 See David W. Hartmann, Volunteer Imrmunity: Maintaining the Vitality of the Third
Sector of Our Economy, 10 U. BRIIGEPORT L. REv. 63, 64 (1989).
86 The terms of these statutes tend to vary considerably from state to state and
generalization is difficult. See generally Michael S. Buskus, Comment, Tort Liability and
Recreational Use of Land, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 767 (1979); Dean P. Laing, Comment,
Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: A Critical Analysis, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 312 (1983).
These statutes commonly preclude or limit some types of liability of landowners who permit
use of their land for certain types of recreational activities. The protection afforded by such
statutes frequently requires that no consideration have been received by the landowner.
They also frequently do not apply to some of the more aggravated forms of tortious
conduct, such as intentional torts, recklessness (willful or wanton conduct), or in a few
states even gross negligence. For other limitations on the scope of such statutes, see Bauer
v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331, 778 P.2d 336 (Idaho 1989) (refusing to apply the
recreational use statute to the public school student injured on school football field in
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Finally, although the decisions reach divergent results, some cases have
precluded the vicarious liability of sponsoring organizations for the tortious
conduct of volunteers. 8 7 When vicarious liability for the conduct of volunteers
is rejected, the sponsoring organization is only subject to vicarious liability for
the conduct of their actual employees and perhaps subject to direct liability
based on a corporate negligence theory.
morning before classes). There is some disagreement in some states on the extent to which
such statutes apply to or limit claims by children. See Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 766
P.2d 736 (Idaho 1988); Stanley v. Tilcon Maine, Inc., 541 A.2d 951 (Me. 1988); Buskus,
supra at 785-88.
For a recent example of a case in which a recreational use statute operated to preclude
a claim against the landowner, see Curran v. City of Marysville, 766 P.2d 1141, 1142-44
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989). In Curran, the decision to sue the victim's grandfather, who had
undertaken gratuitously to supervise the child, was no doubt influenced to some extent by
the anticipated effect of the recreational use statute on the liability of the owner of the park
where the accident occurred.
87 There are basically two requirements for a person or entity ("A") to be held
vicariously liable for the conduct of another ("B"). First, there must be a relationship
between A and B that is legally sufficient to support vicarious liability. And, second, the
tortious conduct of B must have occurred within the scope of that relationship. The cases
have disagreed on whether unpaid volunteers have a sufficient relationship with the
sponsoring organization to support the imposition of vicarious liability. The majority of
cases that have addressed the question have approved the application of vicarious liability
with respect to the conduct of volunteers. See Allan Manley, Annotation, Liability of
Charitable Organization Under Respondeat Superior Doctine for Tort of Unpaid Volunteer,
82 A.L.R.3D 1213, 1219 (1978 & Supp. 1990). A number of cases, especially more recent
decisions, however, have been reluctant to hold a sponsoring organization vicariously liable
for the conduct of volunteers. See McGarr v. Baltimore Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am.
Inc., 536 A.2d 728, 735 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (Boy Scout area council, characterized as an
"umbrella organization," not vicariously liable for the actions of scoutmaster of one of its
troops), cert. denied, 542 A.2d 844 (Md. 1988); Mauch v. Kissling, 783 P.2d 601 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1989). In Mauch, plaintiff contended that even if the actual relationship involved
would not support vicarious liability, it could be imposed when the sponsoring organization
(national scouting organization and area council) had "ostensible or apparent authority"
over the individual in question. The court rejected the "ostensible-apparent authority"
argument because there was no evidence that the scout's mother had relied on statements
suggesting apparent authority in deciding to allow her son to engage in the activity that
caused the injury. Nor was there evidence of conduct by sponsoring organizations that
would lead a reasonable person to believe that the scoutmaster was acting with apparent
authority. Id. at 605.
Although the relationship requirement is the most formidable hurdle to vicarious
liability in the context of volunteer services, the scope of employment requirement may
occasionally preclude vicarious liability. See Big Brother/Big Sister of Metro Atlanta, Inc.
v. Terrell, 359 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (alleged sexual molestation by volunteer in
Big Brother organization not within scope of authority).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
4. Effects of Sensational Publicity
A volunteer who is sued by a child for actions occurring while the
volunteer was trying to teach or help is bad news for the volunteer, but makes
a good news story. There will often be interesting facts presenting high drama
in the tale of a youth and his family who strike out to "bite the hand" in effect.
Not only does such publicity discourage potential volunteers 88 from
undertaking or continuing such services, it also breeds more of this type of
litigation.
C. Statutory Immunities
1. Recent Federal Legislative Developments
A number of statutes have been proposed or enacted at both the federal and
state levels that address to varying degrees the potential tort liability of
volunteers. These legislative efforts, however, suffer from serious limitations
and do not represent a satisfactory answer to the problem.
A recent federal bill, the Volunteer Protection Act of 1991, 89 essentially
proposes model legislation, and offers the states financial incentives to
encourage them to adopt legislation that embodies-the essential features of the
proposed legislation. The proposed model legislation would preclude liability
of any volunteer of a nonprofit organization or governmental entity, subject to
a number of preconditions9" and possible exceptions. 91
For a number of reasons, however, the proposed federal statute is not an
effective response to the threat of liability facing volunteers. First, the bill has
not yet been enacted. 92 Second, the bill does not itself create volunteer
88 See Hartmann, supra note 85, at 64.
89 H.R. 911, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced by Rep. Porter, Feb. 6, 1991)
[hereinafter Volunteer Act]. See generally Hartmann, supra note 85. The bill (also
designated H.R. 911) was originally introduced in 1989. A modified version of the act was
then introduced as an amendment to the National Service Act of 1990. See 136 CONG.
REC. H7521-22 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Porter). This abbreviated form
of the act apparently passed the House but was deleted in a Conference Committee. See 137
CONG. REC. H1791 (daily ed. March 19, 1991) (statement by Rep. Porter). The full
version (similar to the 1989 bill) of the bill was again introduced in 1991. See H.R. 911,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). A similar bill has been introduced in the Senate. See S. 1341,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The discussion in the text refers to the current 1991 version
of the House Bill, H.R. 911.
90 Volunteer Act, supra note 89, § 4(a).
91 See id. § 4(d).
92 See supra note 89.
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immunity, 93 but rather seeks to encourage states to enact some form of
volunteer immunity by increasing by a mere 1 percent the fiscal year allotment
that would otherwise be made to such state under the Social Services Block
Grant program.94 Third, the bill's recommended volunteer immunity requires
not only that the volunteer have been acting in good faith within the scope of
his duties with the organization or entity, but also that his conduct not have
been willful and wanton. 95 As will be discussed more fully later,96 the concept
of willful or wanton conduct, representing in some ill-defined way a form of
more extreme negligence, may not afford volunteers sufficient predictability or
protection. Fourth, the states may, if they choose, condition immunity on
adherence by the organization or entity to risk management procedures,
including the mandatory training of volunteers. 97 It is unclear what procedures
and training would be required to satisfy this requirement. Thus, the proposed
immunity accorded to volunteers could be subject to another set of
imponderables, undercutting the reassurance the statute was designed to foster.
Fifth, the states may also create an exception to immunity for injuries arising
out of the operation of motor vehicles and other vehicles. 98 Sixth, the states
may require as a condition for conferring volunteer immunity that the
organization or entity provide a financially secure source of recovery against
it,99 because under the bill, the organization or entity remains potentially liable
for injuries it causes.1l ° This would, of course, greatly increase the cost of the
93 The bill states that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to preempt the laws of
any State governing tort liability actions." Volunteer Act, supra note 89, § 3. The expressed
purpose of the Act is to promote its objectives of fostering volunteer work by
"encouraging" reform of state laws. Id. § 2(b).-
94 See id. § 5(a). The Block Grants are awarded under title XX of the Social Security
Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397 (West 1992) (setting forth the purpose of these grants). The
amounts of potential awards to the states are, however, apparently small. Thus, in 1987, a
one percent increase in New Hampshire's grant would have meant an increase of only
$400,000, and only $3 million for California. See Hartmann, supra note 85, at 70.
95 Volunteer Act, supra note 89, § 4(a)(2).
96 See infra part IV.A.2.g.
97 Volunteer Act, supra note 89, § 4(d)(1).
98 Id. § 4(d)(3).
99 Id. § 4(d)(5).
10 0 Id. § 4(c), 4(d)(2). The act states in general terms that it does not affect the liability
of the nonprofit organization. Id. § 4(c). It also provides that the states may render the
organization or entity subject to liability for the conduct of its volunteers "to the same extent
as an employee is liable, under the laws of that State." Id. § 4(d)(2). It is unclear what
§ 4(d)(2) adds to § 4(c), unless it is somehow designed to invite states to broaden potential
vicarious liability of entities for the conduct of volunteers. Thus, it would also have to be
decided whether the act would actually create such vicarious liability, or rather would allow
such liability only when otherwise applied by the state. See generally supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
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activity and ultimately price many activities out of existence. Seventh, the bill
does not limit the right of the organization or entity to sue the volunteer,
presumably for contribution or indemnity.' 0 1
2. State Legislation
a. Overview of Recent State Legislation
Quite a few states have enacted legislation, much of it recent, that to
varying degrees' 02 purports to limit the potential tort liability of uncompensated
(under most statutes) volunteers for conduct within the scope of their volunteer
work. These statutes differ widely and address many different types of
volunteers. It is conceivable that almost any volunteer could at some time be
engaged, in at least some limited way, in youth activities. I have, however,
tried to focus on those statutes that seem to cover, by encompassing either a
sufficiently broad class of volunteers in general or those specific types of
volunteers who are most directly engaged in organized youth activities,
volunteers most commonly and intensively connected with youth activities. A
number of these statutes deal with potential liability of volunteers of one or
more types of organizations (or corporate entities), including nonprofit,
community, homeowners, governmental, and various other types of
organizations. 10 3 Some statutes apply to such volunteers in general, 104 whereas
101 Id. § 4(b). If a person is immune from liability, he would generally not be subject
to a claim for contribution from a joint tortfeasor. See KEETON E" AL., supra note 1, § 50,
at 339-40. Whether the provision of the act preserving the right of the sponsoring
organization or entity to sue the volunteer represents an exception to this rule, and thus an
exception to the immunity of the volunteer conferred by the act, is unclear. It is possible
that a person who is otherwise immune from claims by one class of persons might still be
subject to claims for indemnity (by a third person who is rendered liable because of the
conduct of the immune person) if such claims are not precluded by the immunity and if
otherwise available. Perhaps this possibility is what was contemplated by the drafters of §
4(b), but the statute is far from clear on this point.
102 Owing to the complexity and diversity of these statutes, many of their details,
qualifications, and limitations must necessarily be omitted as beyond the scope of this
article. Nor was any attempt made here to offer an exhaustive analysis of the law of any
particular state.
103 Some statutes apply to volunteers of only one type of organization, such as
nonprofit organizations, whereas other statutes include several types of entities. The most
common form of statute applies to volunteers of nonprofit or charitable organizations. The
types of organizations covered seem to be the kinds that depend on volunteer services.
104 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-6-103(1) (Michie Supp. 1991); 1992 Colo.
Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1047 (West) (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-115.5)
(with some exclusions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-116(2)(a) (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 8133(a)(1) (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.19 (West Supp. 1990); KY. REV.
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other statutes or provisions apply to certain types of volunteers, 10 5 such as
coaches, managers, and game officials. Some statutes affect only claims by
STAT. ANN. § 411.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & JUD.
PRoc. §§ 5-312(b), 5-314(a)(4) (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-732(1) (1989); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7.1(b) (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.10(a) (Supp.
1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.38 (Anderson 1991).
Many states also have separate statutes or statutory provisions specifically addressing
and limiting to varying degrees the liability of persons holding certain leadership positions,
such as directors, officers, or trustees, of some types of organizations, especially nonprofit
organizations. Some of these do not mention a requirement that the officer, director, or
trustee have performed his services gratuitously. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
116(2)(b) (1987), as amended by 1992 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1144 § 1 (West); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 613.19 (West Supp. 1990); MD. CODE ANN. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
312(a)(7)(i) (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-732(1) (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8332.1(a) (Supp. 1991) (officer or employee of nonprofit association conducting or
sponsoring a sports program). Others do expressly require that the services have been
rendered without compensation. See 1992 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1144, § 2 (West) (to
be codified as COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-115.7); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8133(a)(1)
(Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85W (West Supp. 1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-
7.1 (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-28.1A(a) (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03-44 (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.38 (Anderson 1991); 42 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 8332.2 (Supp. 1991). The overview of volunteer statutes that
follows generally will not address the officer-director types of statutes. Although such
statutes may not be identical to the volunteer statute in the same state, the same diversity
found in the volunteer statutes generally will also be found in the officer-director statutes.
105 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-116 (2.5)(a) (1987) (volunteers serving "as a
leader, assistant, teacher, coach, or trainer for any program, organization, association,
service group, educational, social, or recreational group, or nonprofit corporation serving
young persons or providing sporting programs or activities for young persons"); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85V (West Supp. 1991) (volunteer "manager, coach, umpire
or referee or... an assistant to a manager or coach in a sports program of a nonprofit
association... and... officer, director, trustee, or member thereof serving without
compensation"); MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & IUD. PROC. § 5-313(a)(3) (1989) (volunteer
"athletic coach, manager, official, program leader, or assistant for a community recreation
program"); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:62A-6(a), 2A:62A-6.2 (West Supp. 1991) (volunteer
coaches, managers, or officials, other than those addressed by specified other statutes, or
sponsors for a nonprofit sports team or team affiliated with a county or municipal recreation
department); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8332.1 (Supp. 1991) (volunteer manager, coach,
instructor, umpire, referee, or their assistant in a sports program of a nonprofit association);
Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-50-201 (1990) ("registered" sports officials, presumably
including but not limited to volunteer officials).
Many states also have "Good Samaritan" statutes limiting liability of persons, or
categories of persons (like health care providers), who gratuitously (under most statutes)
render assistance at an accident or emergency. These statutes vary widely. See generally 2
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specified classes of potential claimants, such as participants in the activity in
which the volunteer is providing services, 10 6 while others at least arguably
appear broader in their reach.10 7
For a number of reasons, the protection afforded volunteers by this
patchwork of state statutes is more apparent than real. 108 First, many states
have not enacted this type of legislation, or at least have not passed legislation
that would cover most potential volunteers in youth activities. Given the
opposition by some groups in the legal profession to tort law reform or at least
to restrictions on tort liability, as well as political lethargy in general, the
prospects for either more universal adoption of such statutes or the broadening
of their scope are dim.
Second, the protection provided by these statutes is subject to a variety of
limitations and exceptions. Not only are intentionally inflicted injuries often
excluded, 10 9 but under many statutes, volunteers remain subject to potential
DAVID W. LOUISELL Er AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §§ 21.01-21.60 (1991 & Supp.
1992).
106 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-6-105 (Michie Supp. 1991) ("participant in, or a
recipient, consumer, or user of, the services or benefits of a volunteer"); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-116(2.5)(a) (1987) (applicable to various activities serving young persons,
but not to harm "third persons"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-6(2) (West Supp. 1991)
(applicable to claims by a "player or participant"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-46 (Supp.
1991) (applicable to claims by a "player or participant"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-50-202
(1990) (mjury of player, participant, or spectator). But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-0345
(Supp. 1991).
107 See, e.g., 1992 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1047, 92-1177 § 2 (West) (to be
codified as COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-115.5(4)(a), 13-21-115.7(2); COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-21-116(a), (b) (1987), as amended 1992 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1177 § 1 (West);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8133 (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.19 (West Supp.
1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 85V (West Supp. 1991) (protection afforded by act applicable "to
any person"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-732 (1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.38
(Anderson 1991).
108 One commentator describes these make shift statutes as "clumsy
solutions,... born of nothing more than desperation." HUBER, supra note 67, at 218.
109 These statutes either expressly exclude intentional injuries from the protection they
provide, or do essentially the same thing by making persons subject to liability who did not
act in good faith. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-6-105(2) (Michie Supp. 1991); 1992
Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1047 (West) (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
115.5(4)(a)(1)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-116(2)(a) (1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.200 (Miechie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); MD. CODE ANN. CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
312(d) (Supp. 1991) (liability for malicious conduct to the extent liability exceeds liability
insurance limits of association or organization), § 5-314(c) ("intentionally tortious
conduct"); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 §§ 85V, 85W (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-539.10(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03-44(1), 32-0345(1),
32-03-46(1)(a) (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.38(C)(2), (D)(2) (Anderson
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liability for various forms of unintentional conduct, such as reckless, willful or
wanton conduct, 10 and sometimes even gross negligence. 111 Neither the
concept of willful (or reckless) conduct nor gross negligence has been clearly
defined, at least not with sufficient discreteness to separate it with any
predictable consistency from "ordinary" negligence. 112 Definitions of
willfulness and recklessness have varied. Although some authorities have said
that reckless conduct differs in the quality of the fault-being characterized by a
conscious disregard of the rights of others 113-other definitions of recklessness
seem to distinguish it from ordinary negligence mostly (although perhaps not
exclusively) in the degree of risk involved. 114 The line separating gross
negligence from ordinary negligence is even less discernible." 5 Indeed, it is so
much a matter of degree as to raise a serious doubt whether separate concepts
are administrable at all. In any event, issues of recklessness (and willfulness)
1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-50-203 (1990). The Iowa statute, speaking in terms of
"intentional misconduct," rather than an intentional injury, may arguably adopt a broader
exception. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.19 (West Supp. 1990).
110 See, e.g., 1992 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1047 (West) (to be codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-21-115.5(4)(a)(11)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-116(2)(a), (b), (2.5)(a)
(1987) as amended by 1992 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1177 § 1 (West); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 8133(d) (Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1990); MD. CODEANN. CTs. &JuD. PROC. §§ 5-313(c)(2), (d)(2), 5-314(c) (1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-732(1) (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:62A-6(c), -6.1, -6.2,
2A:53A-7.1(b) (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.14(a)(2) (Supp. 1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 32-03-42, 32-03-44(2), 32-03-45(2) (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.38(C)(2), (D)(2) (Anderson 1991).
111 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-6-105(2) (Michie Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 8133(d) (Supp. 1990); MD. CODE ANN. Crs. & JuD. PROC. § 5-312(d) (to
extent judgment for such gross negligence exceeds limits of liability insurance of the
organization), § 5-313(d)(2) (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §§ 85V, 85W (West
Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:62A-6(c), -6.1, -6.2, 2A:53A-7.1(b) (West Supp.
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.10(a)(2) (Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03-42,
32-03-45(2), 32-03-46(1)(b) (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-50-203 (1990).
112 See infra part IV.A.2.g.
113 See KEEION ET AL., supra note 1, § 34, at 213.
114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). The Restatement requires
creation of a substantially greater risk than would be necessary to make defendant's conduct
negligent. To this extent, then, recklessness differs in degree from negligence. The
Restatement, in some circular reasoning, states that the difference in degree of risk
contemplated by recklessness "is so marked as to amount substantially to a difference in
kind." Id. cmt. g. In another respect the Restatement does, however, seem to require, in a
very ill-defined way, that the quality of the defendant's conduct be more culpable than
necessary for ordinary negligence. Thus, the Restatement requires that defendant have
known or have had reason to know of the risk, rather than he merely should have known.
Id.
115 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 34, at 212.
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and gross negligence, whatever they mean, would usually have to be decided
by a jury. Such prospects hardly seem likely to reassure prospective volunteers.
Furthermore, some states have incorporated more specific exceptions that
limit even further the nature of the conduct potentially shielded from
liability.116 Many statutes also contain a variety of other exceptions and
exclusions that further erode the protection accorded volunteers." 17
116 One statute essentially destroys any real limitation on negligence liability by
requiring that "the services rendered were reasonable under the circumstances." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-539.10(a)(1) (Supp. 1991); see also MD. CODE ANN. COrs. & JuD. PRoc. § 5-
314(b) (1989) (volunteer not protected from liability beyond the limits of personal liability
insurance for conduct of employees or volunteers of charitable organization if he knew or
should have known of the action or omission of the employee or volunteer and approves or
ratifies it, or participates in it); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03-45(1), 32-03-46(1)(a) (Supp.
1991); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.38(B) (Anderson 1991) (volunteer not protected
from liability for conduct of employees or other volunteers of charitable organization if he
authorized, approved, ratified, or otherwise participated in act or omission). Another statute
excludes conduct "permitting unsupervised competition, practice, or activity." See MD.
CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 5-313(c)(3) (1989); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:62A-6(e) (West Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-46(2)(b) (Supp. 1991). One
statute is not applicable to any coach, manager, or official who has not participated in a
safety orientation and training skills program that includes injury prevention, first aid, and
general coaching concepts. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-6(c)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1991);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-46(1)(c) (Supp. 1991) (league or team orientation and training
program). A Pennsylvania statute excludes conduct that "falls substantially below the
standards generally practiced and accepted in like circumstances by similar persons or
similar nonprofit associations... [if the person or association was under a recognized duty
and knew or had reason to know] that such act or omission created a substantial risk of
actual harm to the person or property of another." PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8332.1(a)
(Supp. 1991). The Pennsylvania statute then adds, reassuringly, that "lilt shall be
insufficient to impose liability to establish only that the conduct . . . fell below ordinary
standards of care." Id. An Ohio statute excludes negligence for volunteers in connection
with nonsupervisory or noncorporate services. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.38(D)(2)
(Anderson 1991). An Iowa statute does not apply to "knowing violation of the law." IOWA
CODEANN. § 613.19 (West Supp. 1990).
117 These additional exceptions vary widely from state to state (and sometimes even
between statutes within the same state). For example, some statutes do not apply to injuries
caused by certain types of activities, such as the operation of various motor vehicles, or to
transportation of participants. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-6-105(3) (Nfichie Supp. 1991) (to
extent covered by liability insurance); 1992 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1047, 92-1177 § 2
(West) (to be codified as COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-115.5(5) (to the extent of liability
insurance or uninsured or underinsured motorist insurance), 13-21-115.7(5)); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 8133(c) (Supp. 1990) (to extent covered by liability insurance); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §§ 85V(ii), 85W (West Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:62A-
6(d), 2A:62A-6.2, 2A:53A-7.2(b) (West Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-46(2)(a)
(Supp. 1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8332.1(b)(1)(i), 8332.4(b)(1) (Supp. 1991). A
number of statutes do not apply to the extent a defendant has liability insurance. See, e.g.,
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Third, a number of statutes expressly 1 8 allow (or at least do not preclude)
vicarious liability of the organization for the negligence of its volunteers. 119
Thus, while the volunteers may enjoy some individual protection from some
statutes, the potential imposition of vicarious liability on the organization may
so inflate the costs of the services that they simply cannot be offered.
Therefore, the imposition of vicarious liability may produce (by a somewhat
different route) the same adverse effect that these statutes were designed to
mitigate-the unavailability of important services rendered by volunteers.
Fourth, unlike exculpatory agreements (which inform the signatory by
requiring acquiescence when the agreement is executed), the immunity statutes
do not contain any mechanism to directly inform participants of the limitations
on liability until they are confronted with a defense after litigation is
commenced. As will be discussed more fully later, 120 securing acquiescence to
limitations on volunteer liability not only more fully vindicates the autonomy
interests of the participants, it encourages from the outset more active
involvement by the participants and their families in promoting the overall
quality and safety of the activity.
For all of these reasons, legislative efforts to address the problem of
potential volunteer liability has been bromidic. In the next section, I will
examine how the courts have reacted to efforts by participants and providers of
volunteer services to limit volunteer liability by use of exculpatory agreements.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-6-105 (Michie Supp. 1991); MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & JUD. PRoc.
§ 514(c) (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.1(b) (Supp. 1991). A number of statutes do not
apply to commercial activities. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §§ 85V(i),
85W (West Supp. 1991). Some exclude professional services. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
6-105(4) (Miechie Supp. 1991).
118 As previously noted, whether an organization may be held vicariously liable under
common-law principles for the negligent conduct of its volunteers is subject to divergent
views. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
. 119 See, e.g., 1992 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 92-1047 (West) (to be codified as COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-21-115.5(4)(b)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8133(e) (Supp. 1990); MD.
CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-312(c) (Supp. 1991) (up to limits of liability insurance
when organization has insurance in conformity to statutory provisions); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-732(1) (1989); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.38(E)(2) (Anderson 1991) (stating
that limitations on liability of volunteers not intended to affect liability of charitable
organization).
120 See infra part V.
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IV. AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD
EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
A. In General
1. General Rules
Judicial attitudes toward exculpatory agreements have often been
characterized by ambiguity and unpredictability. This has seriously undercut
one of the primary objectives of such agreements-to lend a degree of certainty
to the liability risks one may encounter when undertaking a specific activity.
Notwithstanding this unpredictability, most courts at least seem to agree on
several general principles. It is usually held that exculpatory agreements may in
appropriate circumstances be enforceable and are thus not invariably invalid. 121
Because, however, such agreements are not favored by the courts, they are
usually strictly construed.1 22 Moreover, a number of important exceptions and
121 See, e.g., Haines v. St. Charles Speedway, Inc., 874 F.2d 572, 575 (8th Cir.
1989) (applying Mo. law); Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.
1989); Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 695 P.2d 361, 363 (Idaho 1985); Falkner v. Hinckley
Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Childress v. Madison
County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143,
145 (Vt. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B, cmt. b (1965); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 1, § 68, at 482 ("There is in the ordinary case no public policy which
prevents the parties from contracting as they see fit, as to whether the plaintiff will
undertake the responsibility of looking out for himself."); Julie A. Springer, Comment,
Releases: An Added Measure of Protection from Liability, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 487 (1987);
Deborah G. Hander, Casenote, Shifiing Risks: Washington Blocks Student Athlete Releases,
25 GONZ. L. REv. 359, 364 & n.38 (1990).
As noted, the general rule has been that negligence claims may be subject to
exculpatory agreements (unless they are invalidated by some exception). Use of exculpatory
agreements (especially disclaimers) has, however, commonly been precluded or restricted
with respect to strict tort products liability claims for personal injury. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965). Regarding breach of warranty claims, see
generally JAMES WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 12-1
to 12-12 (1988). The proposals made in this article are applicable to most forms of
unintentional conduct and would apply to claims against volunteers (and the institutions
providing the volunteer services on a nonprofit basis) even in the unlikely event that a
plaintiff's claim was somehow based on a strict tort liability or breach of implied warranty
theory of liability. See generally infra part VI.C.2.
122 See, e.g., Krazek v. Mountain Rivers Tours, Inc., 884 F.2d 163, 165 (4th Cir.
1989) (applying W. Va. law); Wilson v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 693 F. Supp.
228, 229 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (applying Pa. law); Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d
781, 783 (Colo. 1989); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (en bane);
Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 941, 945 (11. App. Ct. 1989);
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limitations have been adopted by courts that limit the validity of exculpatory
agreements.
The approach taken by most courts when addressing the question of the
validity and effect of an exculpatory agreement has been to acknowledge the
general rule of validity, and then determine if the agreement fits into one or
more limitations or exceptions that would render the agreement inapplicable or
invalid. 123 These limitations and exceptions have so grown in scope that it is
often impossible to determine the validity of a specific exculpatory agreement
without litigating the issue in court. And of course once a decision is rendered,
it may then be too late because the tortious conduct for which liability was to
have been precluded may have already occurred. In the sections that follow, I
will examine these potential limitations and exceptions that may render an
exculpatory agreement inapplicable or invalid.
2. Limitations and Exceptions to Validity ofAgreements
a. Scope and Terns ofAgreement
As a starting point in evaluating any exculpatory agreement, one must
decide whether the allegedly tortious conduct is within the scope of the
agreement. The disfavor with which some courts regard such agreements,
along with the rule that such agreements are to be strictly construed, has
prompted some courts to closely scrutinize the terms of the agreement when
deciding whether the type of conduct in question was included within the
language of the instrument. This tendency has been carried to an extreme by a
few courts. Some have, for example, held exculpatory agreements ineffective to
preclude claims for negligence if the term "negligence" was not expressly
used. 124 Most courts have rejected such an inflexible approach, however, and
Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143, 145 (Vt. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496B, cmt. d (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 68, at 484; Springer, supra
note 121, at 489.
123 See, e.g., Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1989).
. 124 Only a few courts have apparently required that the term "negligence" invariably
be employed. See Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 800 P.2d 1291 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(by implication); Springer, supra note 121, at 489-91. Some courts seem to take an
intermediate position. Thus, in one recent decision, although the court rejected a rule that
would make the presence or absence of the words "negligence" or "bodily injury"
automatically dispositive, the court reversed a summary judgment granted in favor of the
defendant. The court reasoned that the exculpatory agreement that did not employ such
terms was ambiguous and required a trial on the merits to determine, if it was the intent of
the parties to preclude negligence liability. See Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274
Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1990). Some courts state that while the term "negligence" need
not necessarily be used, words conveying a similar meaning must appear in order for the
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do not require specific words such as negligence. They have instead attempted
to determine the intention of the parties from all of the language used.125
A question also may arise whether the agreement sufficiently identified the
activity from which the injury arose. An agreement lacking language sufficient
to identify the activity might be held inapplicable to the injury in question, or
perhaps even unenforceable because it was so "unclear and ambiguous." 126
Here again, it seems best to respect the intention of the parties which seldom
contemplates that the agreement will specifically identify each potential risk,
which would be impossible. As one court noted in a case involving a death in
parachute jumping, "[i]t is not necessary that the parties anticipate the precise
circumstances which resulted in the decedent's accident, where, as here, the
broad language in the exculpatory clause contemplated a wide range of risks
agreement to preclude negligence liability. See Colgan v. Agway Inc., 553 A.2d 143, 146
(Vt. 1988); see also Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 663 (Wis. 1991) (while not
creating a "magic words" rule, court noted that it nevertheless would be "very helpful" if
agreement stated that party was releasing others from negligence).
125 These courts frequently hold that the term "negligence" need not be used if the
intent of the parties to preclude such liability otherwise appears. See, e.g. Krazek v.
Mountain Rivers Tours, Inc., 884 F.2d 163, 166 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying W. Va. law);
Hell Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 785 (Colo. 1989); MUlligan v. Big Valley
Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Wyo. 1988).
126 Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 663 (Wis. 1991). One recent decision has
carried these requirements of identifying the activity to such an unobtainable extreme that
one wonders whether an exculpatory agreement could ever be drafted with the level of
particularity that would satisfy that court. In Dobratz, decedent was killed in a waterski
show sponsored by a club when he was struck by a boat towing other skiers. His widow
sued some club officers and members and the driver of the second boat. Decedent had
signed an agreement that released inter alia "all liability... [and] claims... arising in
connection with this event.., whether arising while engaged in competition or in practice
or preparation therefore, or while upon entering or departing from said premises, from any
cause whatsoever." Id. at 657 n.1. The court held that although the agreement was not
invalid on public policy grounds, it was unenforceable as a matter of law because it failed to
contain a sufficient description of the activity in question. Id. at 663. The court emphasized
that the agreement did not specify the nature of the activity, what particular sorts of skiing
stunts were to be performed, their level of difficulty and dangerousness, or the locations
covered and that it did not specifically mention "ski shows" (as opposed to "competition,"
"practice" or "preparation"). Id. at 661-63. In a holding reminiscent of Bleak House, the
Dobratz court casts such a pall over the question of the required level of specificity to pass
muster that the option of using exculpatory agreements simply becomes illusory. See
generally CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853). To obfuscate matters further, the
court adds a parting shot that "most if not all of the information" the court described as
lacking should have been included. Dobrarz, 468 N.W.2d at 663.
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which could be expected by a participant to occur when jumping out of an
aircraft." 12 7
In the area of youth activities, animated by the ingenuity and curiosity of
children and teenagers, the sources of injury are virtually limitless. It is
essential that a general description of the types of conduct and activity be
sufficient.
b. Incapacity of Victim
Most courts that have addressed the question have held that the fact that the
injured person was a minor justifies invalidation of an exculpatory
agreement. 128 Usually such agreements are held to be voidable by the minor,
who usually is given the power to disaffirm the agreement during minority and
within a reasonable or specified period after reaching majority. 129 Such
127 Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 941, 945 (111. App. Ct.
1989); see also Madison v. Superior Ct., 250 Cal. Rptr. 299, 306 (Ct. App. 1988) (no
requirement that parties have specified (or had specific knowledge) "of the particular risk
which resulted in death").
128 See Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir. 1960)
(applying Mass. law); Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp.
140, 142 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Academy & Junior College,
630 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 372 n.1, (Colo.
1981) (en bane); Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 468
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1958); Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Me. 1979);
Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970); Santangelo v. City of New York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1978); Kotary
v. Spencer Speedway, Inc., 365 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (App. Div. 1975); Kaufman v. American
Youth Hostels, Inc., 177 N.Y.S.2d 587, 593 (App. Div. 1958) (exculpatory agreement
signed by father and minor decedent voidable with respect to survival-type claim by
administrator of estate; effect of agreement on wrongful-death-type claim by father would
depend on whether father agreed in his own right to release claim), modfied, 158 N.E.2d
128 (N.Y. 1959) (also striking exculpatory-agreement defense with respect to the wrongful
death-type claim by father, perhaps because agreement was equivocal); Rogers v.
Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245-46 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1990); Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (dicta);
RIFFER, supra note 73, at 523; JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF
SPORTS 966 (1979); Springer, supra note 121, at 496. See generally E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.3-4.4 (2d ed. 1990); JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS § 23 (3d ed. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 7, 12(2)(b),
14 (1979).
129 See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 128, § 4.4; MURRAY, supra note 128,
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exculpatory agreements releasing future tort claims of minors130 have usually
been held invalid or voidable whether signed by the minor 131 or by someone
with authority to act on the minor's behalf, such as a parent. 132 One recent
130 A number of courts have held that the parents, however, may release their own
claims growing out of the injury to their minor children. See note 148 infra and
accompanying text.
131 See Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir. 1960)
(applying Mass. law) (invalid even though minor misrepresented his age; signed by minor);
Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 142 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (signed by both child and parent); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 372 n.1, 373
(Colo. 1981) (en bane) (signed by both victim and mother); Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970) (signed by both child and
parent); Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 177 N.Y.S.2d 587, 593 (App. Div.
1958) (exculpatory agreement signed by father and minor decedent voidable with respect to
survival-type claim by administrator of estate; effect of agreement on wrongful death-type
claim by father would depend on whether father agreed in his own right to release claim),
modified, 158 N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1959) (also striking exculpatory-agreement defense with
respect to the wrongful-death-type claim by father, perhaps because agreement was
equivocal); Springer, supra note 121, at 496. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACrS §§ 7, 12(2)(b), 14 (1979). On the effects of a minor's misrepresentation of
age, see generally A.D. Kaufman, Annotation, Infant's Misrepresentation as to His Age As
Estopping Him from Disaffirming His Voidable Transaction, 29 A.L.R.3D 1270 (1970 &
Supp. 1991) (division of authority).
132 See Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 142
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (exculpatory release signed by both child and parent); Apicella v. Valley
Forge Military Academy & Junior College, 630 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Jones v.
Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 372 n.1, 373 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (signed contracts by minors
voidable; approving in principle the rule that "approval by a parent does not necessarily
validate an infant child's contract" signed by both victim and mother); Fedor v. Mauwehu
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 468 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958) (release
signed by father); Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Me. 1979)
(executed by parents, dicta or alternate ground, because the court held that the document
was not a release); Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 558 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970) (signed by father and minor); Santangelo v. City of New York,
411 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1978) (signed by father); Kotary v. Spencer Speedway,
Inc., 365 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (App. Div. 1975); Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc.,
177 N.Y.S.2d 587, 593 (App. Div. 1958) (exculpatory agreement signed by both father and
decedent-minor, voidable with respect to survival-type claim by administrator of estate;
effect of agreement on wrongful-death-type claim would depend on whether agreement
interpreted to indicate that father agreed in his own right to release claim), modified 158
N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1959) (also striking exculpatory-agreement defense with respect to the
wrongful-death-type claim by father, perhaps because agreement was equivocal); Rogers v.
Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245-46 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1990) (exculpatory agreement signed by minor's mother; invalid in wrongful death claim);
Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (dicta; release signed
by mother); Scott v. Pacific W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) ('his
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decision, however, representing a distinct minority view, has held that a parent
can enter into a binding exculpatory agreement on behalf of a minor child. 133
Judicial opinions invalidating exculpatory agreements executed by or on
behalf of minors are often conclusory and lacking in analysis. 134 Courts
articulating their reasons usually argue that invalidating such agreements is
necessary to protect minors from their own improvidence and imprudence, 135
and from the overbearance of unscrupulous adults. 136
The weight of judicial authority appears at first blush to represent a rather
uncompromising attitude toward exculpatory agreements for minors.
Nevertheless, I believe that there are good reasons to questiorf that position,
especially when the person ostensibly protected by the exculpatory agreement is
an unpaid volunteer.
First, although exculpatory agreements for minors are often invalidated
even when also signed by their parents, a number of doctrines approved by the
courts display a willingness to respect the integrity of a wide range of decisions
made by adults on behalf of minors. Although most courts that have addressed
the question have refused to allow parents to bind their minor children to
exculpatory agreements, cases and statutes 137 have accorded parents broad
case was reported as this Article was going to press and has not been fully incorporated.).
But see Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649-50 (Ct. App.
1990). Agreements by parents to indemnify br hold harmless persons with respect to future
claims by the parents' minor children have also usually been invalid with respect to the
minors' claims, although there is little law on point. See, e.g., Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 7
(dicta); Springer, supra note 121, at 497-98.
133 See Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1990). In
Hohe, the court of appeals recognized in principle that a parent could validly agree on
behalf of his fifteen-year-old child to release defendant's school district and parent-teacher
association from liability for future negligence in connection with the minor's participation
in a hypnotism show sponsored by the PTA as a fund-raising event. The court expressly
held that the minor could not disaffirm the release based on her minority. Id. at 649-50. A
summary judgment granted in favor of the above-named defendants was, however, reversed
on other grounds. Specifically, the court held that the agreement was ambiguous in its scope
and therefore that a trial on the merits was necessary to address the question of whether the
parties intended to release claims for personal injury based on negligence.
134 See, e.g., Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206 (Me. 1979); Santangelo v.
City of New York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1978).
135 See Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 142
(E.D. Pa. 1987); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 373 n.1, 373 (Colo. 1981) (en bane);
Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 468 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1958).
136 See Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l. Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 142
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
137 See generally 59 AM. JUR. 2D, Parent & Child, §§ 10-16, 48 (1987 & Supp.
1992). The interest of parents in making decisions affecting their children has been
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discretion to make other decisions greatly affecting their minor children. These
include the power, subject to state intervention, to select their children's
doctors and consent to (and make other decisions regarding)138 medical
treatment, to discipline their children, to choose their school, to allocate the
family's resources in a way that can profoundly affect their children's health
and future prospects, and to consent to their induction into the armed forces. 139
Indeed, the courts have generally not questioned the power of parents to
consent to their child's participation in a specific activity, only their power to
give up the child's right to sue. Parental consent to medical treatment precludes
a claim for battery based on the consented-to treatment. 140 Presumably,
parental consent, if sufficiently specific, would also preclude an intentional tort
claim based on consented-to contacts that are a normal part of recreational
activities. Parental consent has also operated, for all intents and purposes, to
foreclose certain other types of tort claims. Thus, for example, one court even
held that a parent may validly agree to the publication of nude photographs of
the parent's minor children. 141 In short, judicial attitudes toward exculpatory
agreements signed by parents on behalf of their minor children seem
inconsistent with the powers conferred on parents respecting other important
life choices.
Second, courts have recognized that the benefits of enforcing agreements
by or on behalf of minors may sometimes outweigh the potential costs. This
statutorily recognized in at least one state. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04(7) (West
1990).
138 See JOSEPH H. KING JR., THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL
134-36, 144-46 (2d ed. 1986); supra note 69. Although many living will statutes do not
provide for execution of such instruments on behalf of minors, a number of states expressly
do allow parents to execute living wills for their minor children. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-17-214 (Nfichie Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6 (West 1990);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-4 (Michie 1986); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 672.006 (West 1990). See generally John M. Scheb, Terdnation of Life Support Systems
for Minor Children: Evolving Legal Responses, 54 TENN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986).
139 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 454(c)(4) (1982) (seventeen-year-olds may volunteer for
induction into the Armed Forces with consent of parents or guardian). The effect of this
parental consent is not only to subject the minor to military control, but also to the judicial
decisions and statutes that have precluded or at least limited tort claims by military members
against either the Federal Government, fellow servicemen, or other federal employees for
injuries arising incident to service. See generally United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681
(1987); Byard Q. Clemmons, Personal Liability of the Military Official, 7 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 417 (1991).
140 See generally KING, supra note 138, at 134.
141 See Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 799 F.2d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1986)
(applying Cal. law; addressing photographs that do not fall within the Supreme Court's
definition of child pornography), aff'g, 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1354-55 (N.D. Tex. 1985)
(applying Tex. law; dicta applying Cal. law); see also Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d 108
(N.Y. 1983) (nonpornographic nude photographs of ten-year-old).
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realization has inspired several limitations on the doctrine that invalidates
agreements by minors. Agreements by'minors for so-called "necessaries" may
at least support a claim against the infant for the value of the necessaries in
many jurisdictions. 142 Courts have also upheld agreements executed by parents
on behalf of minors to arbitrate future malpractice claims143 and to give a
medical insurer a subrogation interest for medical conditions tortiously caused
by third parties. 144 These doctrines all seem inspired by a common premise-
that sometimes the interests of minors are better served by respecting
agreements made during their minority. Sometimes services of extreme
importance to minors may simply not be available in the absence of an
agreement binding the minor recipient of those services. Thus, recognizing the
power of a parent subscribing to a Blue Cross hospitalization plan to bind a
minor son to a subrogation clause giving insurer a subrogation claim against
any recovery from a tortfeasor to the extent of benefits provided by insurer,
was necessary to assure that parents could provide medical insurance protection
for their children.145
As a practical matter, the availability and quality of recreational and
extracurricular educational activities surely depend on the willingness of
volunteers to provide such services. I think a convincing argument can be made
that the importance of such activities justifies giving parents authority to enter
into binding agreements necessary to secure these services.
Third, when the person released is a volunteer, there is less reason to fear
that overbearance will adversely affect the interests of the minor. Volunteers
are not driven by the kinds of economic incentives that can inspire pressure
tactics inconsistent with the interests of the minor. It is significant that the
majority of cases refusing to uphold exculpatory agreements by or on behalf of
minors in connection with recreational activities have involved injuries
142 See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 128, § 4.5; MURRAY, supra note 128, §
24.
143 See, e.g., Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1965); Wilson v. Kaiser Found.
Hosp., 190 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 788 P.2d
164, 169 (Haw. 1990); cf. McKinsky v. Valley Ob-Gyn Clinic, P:C., 405 N.W.2d 88
(Mich. 1987) (applying statute authorizing parental consent for arbitration of minor's claims
based on non-emergency care).
144 See Hamrick v. Hospital Serv. Corp., 296 A.2d 15 (R.L 1972).
145 See id. at 17. The court held that the legal principles governing contracts of infants
was simply not germane. It noted that the parents were obligated to provide for the "care,
nurture, welfare and education" of minor children, and that the availability of medical
insurance for minors depended on whether parents could contract to so provide for their
children. Id. The court suggested that the primary inquiry should be whether the contract
was reasonable. Id. See also Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965).
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allegedly caused by persons who were probably compensated by someone for
those services. 146
Fourth, although parents have usually not been permitted to bind their
minor children to exculpatory agreements, some courts have held that the
parents' own cause of action for their child's medical expenses and loss of
services147 attributable to the child's injury may be subject to an exculpatory
agreement by the parents. 148
146 In most of these cases it was either stated explicitly or was a reasonable assumption
that the sponsor or persons whose alleged negligence caused the injuries were compensated
for the services. See Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605, 607 (lst Cir.
1960) (applying Mass. law); Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F.
Supp. 140, 142 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying Pa. law); Apicella v. Valley Forge Military
Academy & Junior College, 630 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying Pa. law); Jones
v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 372 n.1, 373 (Colo. 1981) (en bane); Doyle v. Bowdoin College,
403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Me. 1979) (dicta or alternate ground, because the court held that
the document was not an exculpatory release-agreement); Santangelo v. City of New York,
411 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (admission fee charged by defendant-city);
Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 558 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div.
1970) (activity earned as prize by newsboy from defendant-newspaper); Kaufman v.
American Youth Hostels, Inc., 174 N.Y.S.2d 580, 584 (Sup. Ct. 1957), modified, 177
N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1958), modified, 158 N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1959); Childress v.
Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (exculpatory agreement signed by
mother on behalf of mentally incompetent person not binding on him; dicta that parent or
guardian may not bind minors to exculpatory agreement).
Cases addressing the validity of exculpatory agreements on behalf of minors in
connection with recreational activity in which at least some of the services were provided by
unpaid volunteers are more divided. Compare Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of
Am., Inc., 143 A.2d 466 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958) (invalid); Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage
Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245-46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (invalid), with
Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1990) (may be valid;
defendants were school district and Parent, Teacher, and Student Association, thus
suggesting that at least some of the individuals allegedly responsible for the injury were
unpaid PTSA volunteers). In Fedor, the court held that a minor's claim against the Boy
Scouts for injuries allegedly suffered at scout camp was not precluded by an exculpatory
agreement executed on his behalf by his father. However, the precedential weight of the
opinion is undermined in several respects. First, the primary reason the court invalidated the
release seemed to be based on a general public policy/public interest analysis. See generally
infra part IV.A.2.d. Second, when the court does shift its attention to the effect of the
minority on such agreements, its holding is equivocal and conclusory. After noting the
policy of attempting to protect infants, the court states that it is "doubtful" whether either
parent could waive the infant's rights to recover for negligence. See id. at 468.
147 See generally Steven W. Feldman, Parent's Cause of Action in Tennessee for
Injured Child's Lost Earnings and Services, Expenses, and Lost Society: A Comparative
Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 83 (1983).
148 See Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 142
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying Pa. law); Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Academy & Junior
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Fifth, minors have been accorded greater control over their own lives in
recent years, including matters bearing on potential tort recovery. For example,
mature minors have, in some jurisdictions, been held capable of giving valid
consent to medical treatment. 149 And such consent may operate to preclude a
tort claim for battery. Some states recognize that some minors may possess the
College, 630 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying Pa. law); Rogers v. Donelson-
Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (dicta);
Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tenn. Ct.. App. 1989) (mother's
exculpatory and indemnity agreement for mentally impaired adult son; dicta as to minors).
But see Santangelo v. City of New York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1978)
(father's cause of action for loss of services not precluded by exculpatory agreement he
signed; this is, however, dicta or at most an alternative holding because the father's claim
for loss of services was held not to be covered by the agreement); cf. Kotary v. Spencer
Speedway, 365 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 1975) (father's derivative claim based on injury to
child not precluded because the language of the agreement signed by the father did not
encompass that claim). One would also expect that if the parents signed an exculpatory
agreement that covered the parents' claims arising from injuries to their minor children,
such agreements might also bar the parents' claims for emotional distress suffered as a result
of the minor's injury even if otherwise available. Cf Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528
(NJ. 1980). See generally P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in
Negligence for Fear of Injury to Another, or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such
Injury, 29 A.L.R.3D 1337, 1363 (1970 & Supp. 1990) (contributory negligence of a parent
may either bar claim, or under comparative negligence reduce damages, in parent's claim
for mental distress based on observing injury to child). It should be noted that even if a
court holds that a parent may in principle agree to release their own claims based on injuries
to their child, a question may remain whether the agreement must specifically embrace such
parental claims, or whether the parents' release of the minor's claims automatically includes
the parents' derivative claims for loss of services and medicals. If it is required that specific
language have released the parents' claims, then it must also be determined whether the
language in the agreement in fact did so.
The potential effect of parental execution of an exculpatory agreement on wrongful
death claims (and perhaps survival claims when a survival statute is applicable to cases
involving tortiously caused death) would depend on the resolution of two issues: first,
whether the agreement was construed to cover such claims; and, second', whether such
agreements were valid as applied to the parents' claim based on the death of the child. See
generally Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1958)
(exculpatory agreement, signed by father and minor-decedent voidable with respect to
survival-type claim by administrator of estate; effect of agreement on wrongful-death-type
claim by father would depend on whether agreement was interpreted to indicate that father
had agreed in his own right to release claim), modified, 158 N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1959) (also
striking exculpatory-agreement defense with respect to wrongful-death-type claim by father,
perhaps because agreement was equivocal); Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of
Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245-46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (exculpatory agreement
signed by mother invalid in wrongful death claim for death of minor-daughter); KEErON El
AL., supra note 1, § 127, at 958-59.
149 See supra note 69; see generally KING, supra note 138, at 134-36.
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capacity to validly consent to be a guest under a guest statute limiting the
guest's right to sue certain persons. 150 Also, persons who executed exculpatory
agreements as minors, may, for example, ratify such agreements upon reaching
majority. 151 Moreover, such ratification may, at least with respect to accidents
occurring after majority, take the form of continuing to participate in the
subject activity.' 52 One might ask whether a youth who has just reached
majority is really in any better position to evaluate and adjust his priorities than
were he and his devoted parents a few days earlier.
And finally, as will be discussed more fully later, I doubt whether
invalidating exculpatory agreements really promotes the interests tort liability
ostensibly serves. 153 And what about the larger interest of all the children for
whom youth activities would simply not be available or affordable if the
millions of unpaid volunteers who provide them are terrorized out of such
activities?
c. Contracts of Adhesion and Unacceptable Disparity in Bargaining
Power
Some courts have approved the rule that exculpatory agreements may be
invalid based on extreme disparity in bargaining power between the parties. 154
It is often difficult to know in advance, however, precisely which relationships
involve sufficiently disparate bargaining power to justify invalidating
exculpatory agreements. Courts sometimes state that such disparity may be
characterized by the lack of opportunity for negotiation or by the fact that the
services in question could not be obtained elsewhere. 155 On the other hand, a
number of courts hold that the mere fact that a contract is offered on a "take it
or leave it" basis does not alone make it an invalid contract of adhesion. 156
Frequently, the fact of disparity in bargaining power is integrated as a relevant
150 See, e.g., Fox v. Hollar Company, Inc., 576 So. 2d 223, 227 (Ala. 1991).
151 See, e.g., Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) (en bane). See generally
FARNSWORTH, supra note 128, § 4.4; MURRAY, supra note 128, § 23.
152 See Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) (en bane.).
153 See infra part V.B.1.b.
154 See, e.g., Dressel, 623 P.2d at 374; Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of
Am., 143 A.2d 466, 467 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958); Schlobohm v. SPA Petite, Inc., 326
N.W.2d 920, 923 (Mimn. 1982).
155 See Dressel, 623 P.2d at 374. Some courts imply that it must appear that the
parties possessed greatly disparate bargaining power, that no opportunity for negotiation
existed, and that the services could not be obtained elsewhere. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at
923.
156 Dressel, 623 P.2d at 375.
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consideration into a broader public policy inquiry. 157 The significance of a
disparity in bargaining power ultimately depends on the importance of the
services in question.
Irrespective of how the court elaborates on the disparity-of-bargaining-
power idea, the great majority of cases have found the rule inapplicable to
exculpatory agreements covering recreational activities. 158 With respect to any
particular recreational activity, it usually cannot be said that the participant has
no choice. He can always choose not to participate in that activity. Thus, in the
case of youth activities, were it not for the fact that the participants were
minors, the exculpatory agreements would generally not be invalidated based
on disparity of bargaining power.
d. Public Policy Grounds
Exculpatory agreements are frequently subjected to a more general public
policy analysis. This analysis will often overlap or at least encompass the
disparity in bargaining power inquiry (which may depend on the necessity for
the services in question). Probably the most widely-cited formulation of the
public policy analysis comes from the California case of TunId v. The Regents
of the University of California.159 The court held that exculpatory agreements
could only be enforced if they did not involve the "public interest." 160
Elaborating, the court identified the following set of criteria, some or all of
which are present in transactions in which exculpatory agreements may not be
enforced:
It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public
regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of
great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for
some members of the public. The party holds himself out as willing to perform
this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any
member coming within certain established standards. As a result of the
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the
party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining
strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. In exercising
a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized
adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser
may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence.
Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is
157 See infra part IV.A.2.d; see also infra note 161 and accompanying text (Tunkl
quote).
158 See cases cited infra note 165.
159 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
160 Id. at 443.
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placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the
seller or his agents. 16 1
Other courts employ somewhat different variations on the public policy
theme. For example, a Colorado court used a four-part inquiry concentrating
on "(1) the existence of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service
performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the
intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language." 162
The underlying conflict has been identified as autonomy to contract versus
vindication of the policies underlying tort liability.' 63 As will be discussed
more fully later, however, upholding exculpatory agreements will sometimes
do more to promote the avowed goals of tort law than would the threat or
imposition of tort liability. In other words, protection of autonomy and
promotion of the goals of tort law may not be incompatible here.
Regardless of the precise terminology used, courts addressing the public
policy issue in recreational activities cases usually focus on the importance of
the services in question to the public and on their availability. 164 The decided
weight of authority has held that recreational activities do not fall within the
category of activities with respect to which exculpatory clauses would violate
public policy. 165 The courts have usually emphasized that the plaintiff was free
161 Id. at 445-46 (footnotes omitted). The court applied the accompanying factors to
invalidate an exculpatory agreement executed by a patient in connection with medical
services received at defendant's hospital. The Tunkl formulation was clouded somewhat by
the existence of a general statute that invalidated some exculpatory agreements. Its
relevance and importance in the court's decision was unclear from the opinion. In any
event, and whatever its underpinnings, the Tunki formulation has been approved by many
subsequent cases. See Hander, supra note 121, at 364 n.38 (citing cases).
162 Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (en bane).
163 See, e.g., Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989)
("They stand at the crossroads of two competing principles: freedom of contract and
responsibility for damages caused by one's own negligent acts."); Springer, supra note 121,
at 488.
164 See, e.g., Schlobohm v. SPA Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 925 (Minn. 1982);
Recent Cases, Negligence-Exculpatory Causes-School Districts Cannot Contract Out of
Negligence Liability in Interscholastic Athletics, 102 HARV. L. REV. 729, 733 (1989).
165 See, e.g., Barnes v. Birmingham Int'l Raceway, Inc., 551 So. 2d 929 (Ala. 1989)
(stock car racing event); Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct.
App. 1990) (hypnotism demonstration); Madison v. Superior Ct., 250 Cal. Rptr. 299 (Ct.
App. 1988) (scuba diving course); Williams v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 283 S.E.2d 367 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1981) (marathon race); Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d 485, 491 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986) (parachute jumps); Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Ass'n, 509 A.2d 151
(N.H. 1986) (kart racing); Mann v. Wetter, 785 P.2d 1064 (Or. Ct. App.) (en banc) (scuba
diving school), petition for review denied, 789 P.2d 1387 (Or. 1990); Buckner v. Varner,
793 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (horseback riding); Hays v. Ernesto's Inc.,
1987 WL 11119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (mechanical bull); Dobratz v. Thomson, 468
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to choose not to participate in the activity 166-thus indicating that there was no
unacceptable imbalance in bargaining power nor unavailability of truly essential
services.
The Tunk! court also held that if an exculpatory agreement is otherwise
invalid on public policy grounds, the mere fact that the services were gratuitous
would not alone render it valid. 167 Even if one accepts arguendo this argument,
however, it must be remembered that not all exculpatory agreements are invalid
on public policy grounds, and thus the need to attempt to sustain them with a
"gratuitous services" argument is unnecessary. Thus, although the mere fact
that the services in question were gratuitous may not validate an otherwise
invalid exculpatory agreement, the gratuitous nature of the services should
N.W.2d 654, 660 (Wis. 1991) (water ski show; but holding agreement unenforceable on
other grounds); Trainor v. Aztalan Cycle Club, Inc., 432 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) ("motocross" race); Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Wyo. 1988)
(skiing during "Ironman" contest); Boehm v. Cody County Chamber of Commerce, 748
P.2d 704, 711 (Wyo. 1987) (mock gunfights). But cf. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326
(McKinney 1989) (agreements exempting owners or operators of recreational
establishments charging fees for use of facilities and their agents, servants, or employees,
from negligence liability to users are void); Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-
166J, 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988) (en bane) (exculpatory agreement invalid when required
for participation by school students in interscholastic athletics).
166 See, e.g., Barnes v. Birmingham Int'l Raceway, Inc., 551 So. 2d 929 (Ala. 1989)
(plaintiff voluntarily participated in stock car racing event); Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch.
Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1990) (hypnotism demonstration at PTA fund raising
activity not an essential service); Madison v. Superior Ct., 250 Cal. Rptr. 299, 305 (Ct.
App. 1988) (there was no practical necessity that decedent take scuba diving course);
Williams v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 283 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Boucher v. Riner,
514 A.2d 485, 491 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (plaintiff under no compulsion to make
parachute jumps, and could have bypassed exculpatory agreement upon payment of
additional fee); Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Ass'n, Inc., 509 A.2d 151 (N.H. 1986)
(kart racing); Mann v. Wetter, 785 P.2d 1064 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (en bane) (participant in
scuba diving school free to not continue in the diving program); Hays v. Ernesto's Inc.,
1987 WL 11119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (mechanical bull); Trainor v. Aztalan Cycle Club,
Inc., 432 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) ("motocross" race); Milligan v. Big Valley
Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Wyo. 1988) (skiing during "Ironman" contest "not a matter of
practical necessity for the public" nor an essential service); Boehm v. Cody County
Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 711 (Wyo. 1987) (mock gunfights "can hardly be
characterized as essential to some members of the public"). For example, in Williams v.
Cox Enterprises, Inc., 283 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981), plaintiff, a law student at the
University of Chicago, had argued that because running and jogging had become such
popular sports and because the Peachtree Road Race was the only race of its kind in the
Atlanta area, he lacked sufficient freedom of bargaining power when he signed an
exculpatory agreement in connection with his participation in the marathon race. The court
dismissed this argument as "ludicrous." Id. at 369.
167 383 P.2d 447, 448 (Cal. 1963).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
certainly strengthen already compelling arguments that recreational activities do
not fall within the class of activities for which exculpation normally violates
public policy.
Reservations about exculpatory agreements also stem from a concern about
a possible asymmetry of information shared by the parties. 168 This concern,
however, has probably been exaggerated. Even in exculpatory agreements
between patients and health care providers-the ones most frequently declared
unenforceable on public policy grounds-the true level of disparity in risk
awareness has been questioned. 169 Due to the "availability heuristic," which
causes people "to weigh disproportionately information with high salience,
memorability, or currency," 170 people may actually tend to overestimate rather
than underestimate the risks of a familiar activity. 171 In the context of youth
activities, parents will often possess at least as much basic information as
volunteers. Moreover, they will commonly overestimate the extent of the risk
to their own children, thus if anything making them more cautious in their
willingness to agree to exculpation.
A general public policy analysis has seldom been reached in connection
with exculpatory agreements relating to youth recreational activities because
these cases have usually been decided on the threshold basis of the minor status
of the participants. 172 If we were to put aside for the moment the problem of
minority, and focus exclusively on the public policy question, the issue would
likely boil down to the questions of the importance of providing youth activities
and the availability of alternatives to them. Any one such activity would
probably not be deemed essential-there will usually be alternatives even in
small communities. On the other hand, it could be argued convincingly that
youth activities taken together are essential to the health and welfare of society.
Accordingly, one might therefore be tempted to reason that proliferation of
exculpatory agreements could adversely affect the availability of most youth
activities, if they discouraged children from participating. Therefore, the
argument might go, these agreements should be deemed invalid as violative of
public policy. This argument may seem plausible enough as far as it goes.
There is, however, a fallacy lurking here. If such activities are truly of great
importance to the public, and if they will not be available without volunteers,
168 See Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks
Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 173, 188 (1986).
16 9 Id.
170 Id. at 189, citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNrrlvE PSYCHOLOGY 267 (1973).
171 Thus, in another context, Robinson comments that the availability heuristic may
lead people to avoid risks rather than to assume them "because bad outcomes will be more
vividly reported and remembered than favorable outcomes ('bad news travels fhst,' that is
[sic]it has greater salience or availability)." Robinson, supra note 168, at 190.
172 See supra part IV.A.2.b.
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then invalidating exculpatory agreements may well mean that the activities
would not be available at all. Thus, the real choice may be between the
disappearance of such activities altogether (at least those available at affordable
cost) or having those activities available but subject to valid exculpatory
agreements for the volunteers (and sponsors) who provide the activities. In
other words, in applying the public policy analysis, the courts should
remember that the ultimate effect of invalidating exculpatory agreements for
volunteers may well be to destroy the very activity that ostensibly was to be
protected by invalidating the exculpatory agreements in the first place.
Another potential problem with public policy tests is that they are
inherently unpredictable. First, under the 'commonly followed Tunkl
formulation, a party challenging the validity of an exculpatory agreement need
not necessarily prove the presence of all factors enumerated by the court as
evidencing contracts affecting the public interest, only "some" of them. 173
Second, such public policy questions are analyzed on an ad hoc basis, 174
making the outcome of any particular exculpatory agreement practically
impossible to predict with confidence. As one court candidly admitted, "it has
been much easier for courts to simply declare releases violative of public policy
in a given situation than to state a principled basis for so holding." 175
e. Express or Implied Statutory Invalidation
Occasionally a state statute will operate to invalidate an exculpatory
agreement. A statute may expressly prohibit exculpatory agreements, or at least
exculpatory agreements in certain types of situations. 176 Or, a statute may
accomplish essentially the same result by implication, as when it creates duties
that are construed to be not subject to waiver.177 In Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 178
173 See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1963).
174.Schlobohm v. SPA Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. 1982).
175 Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 971 (Wash.
1988).
176 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (West 1987) (exculpatory agreements for
physical injury are void); Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d 811 (La. 1991);
Meier v. Ma-Do Bars, Inc., 484 N.Y.S.2d 719, 720 (App. Div. 1985); Anita Cava & Don
Wiesner, Rationalizing A Decade of Judicial Responses to Exculpatory Oauses, 28 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 611, 625, 631-32 (1988).
177 See Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 695 P.2d 361, 364 (Idaho 1984); Cava & Wiesner,
supra note 176, at 632-33; 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 25 (1989); cf. Rollins, Inc. v.
Heller, 454 So. 2d 580, 583-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (limitations of damages clause),
petition for rev. denied, 461 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1985). See generally KEETON Er AL., supra
note 1, § 68, at 492-93. One statute declares, inter alia, that exculpatory agreements for
violations of "law" (presumably statutory law) "whether willful or negligent" are contrary to
public policy. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985). The relevance of Section 1668 to
negligence claims not involving statutory violations is unclear. See supra note 164.
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for example, plaintiff was injured during a horseback trail ride conducted by
defendant outfitter and guide. The accident was apparently caused by a saddle
that loosened during the ride. The court upheld the validity of an exculpatory
agreement with respect to the defendant's purely common law theories of
liability. It held, however, that a statute requiring guides to "conform to the
standard of care expected of members of his profession," 179 created statutorily
imposed duties that were not subject to waiver by exculpatory agreement.
The Lee case illustrates the way in which exculpatory agreements (and the
intent of the parties) may be subverted indirectly by statute. The statute in Lee
did not expressly preclude such agreements. It merely adopted a broad open-
ended duty of care. When, as in Lee, such general statutes are allowed to
impliedly invalidate exculpatory agreements, one wonders whether an
exculpatory agreement could have any effect at all in the type of activity in
question. Thus, there seems to be a danger that a variety of statutes that
perhaps do little more than, as in Lee, codify common-law duties of care will
be construed to adopt a duty that is not subject to contractual exculpation. The
threat of implied statutory invalidation adds a further degree of uncertainty to
exculpatory agreements.
If volunteers are to be effectively protected by exculpatory agreements,
such agreements should not be invalidated by statutes unless the statutory
provisions expressly preclude such agreements. Or, at a minimum, it should be
made clear under precisely what circumstances creation of a duty by statute
will impliedly invalidate otherwise valid exculpatory agreements.
f. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Some courts have invalidated exculpatory agreements when the defendants
made material misrepresentations that induced the plaintiffs to enter into such
agreements.180 Thus, one case held that misstatements in the agreement that the
defendant did not have liability insurance covering equestrian activities when it
178 695 P.2d 361 (Idaho 1984).
179 Id. at 364.
180 See generally Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. 1982); Dobratz v.
Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 659-60 (Wis. 1991) (approving rule in principle, but finding it
inapplicable under facts of case); Springer, supra note 121, at 496. Courts disagree on
whether actual reliance by the plaintiff must be shown. Conpare Merten (misstatements
relevant to a reasonable person's decision sufficient; no requirement of proof of actual
reliance) with Barnes v. Birmingham Int'l Raceway, 551 So. 2d 929 (Ala. 1989) (reliance
required). The exception based on misrepresentation inducing the plaintiff to agree to
exculpation is a somewhat different ground from cases in which plaintiffs theory of
recovery is fraud. In the latter cases, courts have held that such claims, being intentional
torts, are not subject to exculpatory agreements. See L. Luria & Son, Inc. v. Honeywell,
Inc., 460 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); infia part IV.A.2.f.
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in fact did carry such insurance rendered the exculpatory clause
unenforceable. 181
To protect the intent of the parties, the courts should require clear and
convincing evidence of an intentional and material misrepresentation and proof
of plaintiff's detrimental reliance on it before invalidating an exculpatory
agreement for that reason.
g. More Serious Tortious Conduct
Even if an exculpatory agreement is otherwise valid, many courts have
held that such agreements will not preclude tort liability for various forms of
more serious tortious conduct. Exculpatory agreements may be invalidated
under either of two analytical routes.18 2 First, a court may construe the scope
of the agreement as not embracing various forms of serious misconduct. 183
Second, and more common, courts may hold that agreements purporting to
preclude liability for some types of serious misconduct are, as a matter of
public policy, simply unenforceable. Most courts have held that exculpatory
agreements cannot preclude claims for intentional torts184 nor for more extreme
forms of negligence characterized by willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. 185
181 See Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. 1982); see also Dobratz, 468
N.W.2d at 659-60 (approving rule in principle, but finding it inapplicable under facts of
case).
182 See Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d 485, 488 (Md. Ct. App. 1986).
183 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. d (1965) (agreement
exempting defendant from liability for negligence will not be construed to preclude liability
for intentional or reckless misconduct or extreme kinds of negligence, "unless such intention
clearly appears").
184 See, e.g., Reece v. Finch, 562 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 1990); L. Luria & Son, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 460 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a (1979); KEErON ET AL., supra note 1, § 68, at 480-84.
Presumably, however, if plaintiff effectively acquiesced to the specific conduct of the
defendant under circumstances that constituted a valid consent, it is possible that there
would be no liability for intentional torts. The question of the effect of the exculpatory
agreement would not even be reached. Rather, liability would be foreclosed because one of
the elements for intentional torts-that the defendant's conduct be nonconsensual-would be
missing. Consent, to be effective, would probably have to sufficiently identify the conduct
involved. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A & cmt. c (1979). Other
prerequisites for consent would also have to be satisfied, including capacity to consent or
legally sufficient substituted consent. See generally id. § 89.2A. Presumably, parental
consent on behalf of minor children would not be valid if violative of public policy, such as
consent to some criminal or other type of contact with a child that would be deemed
impermissible even with parental acquiescence.
185 See, e.g., Barnes v. Birmingham Int'l Raceway, Inc., 551 So. 2d 929, 933 (Ala.
1989); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (dicta); Falkner v.
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Although there is a greater split of authority, a majority of courts also hold that
exculpatory agreements are unenforceable if defendant's conduct constituted
gross negligence.18 6
An exculpatory agreement should probably not be enforceable to the extent
that the defendant's conduct constituted an intentional tort.187 Of course, if the
plaintiff, by agreement or otherwise, had validly 188 consented to the specific
intentional invasion in question, there would be no liability because the
invasion was (even independent of the exculpatory effects of the agreement) not
actionable.
On the other hand, the wisdom of invalidating exculpatory agreements
merely because the defendant's conduct constituted recklessness or gross
negligence is questionable. These concepts lack clear parameters. With respect
to recklessness, common definitions seem to place the concept somewhere
between objective and subjective criteria. To varying degrees, the authorities
often consider either or both of the factors of conscious disregard of the rights
Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 941, 946 (M1. Ct. App. 1989); Tessler & Son,
Inc. v. Sonitrol See. Sys., 497 A.2d 530, 533 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (approving
rule in principle, but finding it inapplicable to facts); Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754
P.2d 1063, 1069 (Wyo. 1988) (approving rule in principle, but finding it inapplicable to
facts); Boehm v. Cody County Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 712 (Wyo. 1987)
(approving rule in principle, but finding it inapplicable to facts); KEETON Er AL., supra
note 1, § 68, at 480-84. But see RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965)
(recognizing a right to enter into a valid exculpatory agreement that precludes liability for
both negligent and reckless conduct).
186 Springer, supra note 121, at 502; see, e.g., Durrell v. Parachutes Are Fun, Inc.,
1987 WL 18117 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987) (applying Md. law); Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d
485, 488 (Md. Ct. App. 1986) Cin principle, but inapplicable to facts); Childress v. Madison
County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (dicta); Liberty Furniture, Inc. v. Sonitrol
of Spokane, Inc., 770 P.2d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 777 P.2d 1050 (Wash.
1989). But see Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Ass'n, Inc., 509 A.2d 151 (N.H. 1986)
(rejecting alleged gross negligence as basis for invalidation); Tessler & Son, Inc. v. Sonitrol
See. Sys., 497 A.2d 530, 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (rejecting alleged gross
negligence as a basis for invalidation); Valeo v. Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc., 500 A.2d 492,
493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (rejecting alleged gross negligence as basis for invalidation);
Trainor v. Aztalan Cycle Club, Inc., 432 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Wis. 1988) (rejecting alleged
gross negligence as basis for invalidation).
187 See generally supra part fII.B.2.a.
188 Consent may be invalidated by a number of factors including incapacity,
misrepresentation, mistake known to the defendant, duress, and (in some states with respect
to some statutes) the fact that the contemplated conduct violated a statutory prohibition or
consent was expressly invalidated by statute. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 18, at
115-24. Courts would also invalidate consent when against public policy. Thus, parental
consent for a child to undergo a type of contact or invasion deemed criminal or
impermissible by society, even with parental acquiescence, would likely be invalid.
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of others,18 9 and more objective factors such as the gravity of risk. 190 A fairly
typical definition contains both subjective and objective dimensions-embracing
conduct taken in reckless conscious disregard of the consequences (subjective)
under circumstances that a reasonable person would have reason to know
would create a "high degree of probability" of harm to another (objective).' 9 '
To further confuse matters, some courts seem to equate recklessness with the
supposedly less extreme gross negligence.192
A recent case involving the death of a participant in a recreational
parachute jump illustrates the apparent ease by which some courts have allowed
plaintiffs to circumvent an exculpatory agreement by invoking the recklessness
(or willfulness) exception. 193 The decedent-who had been a pilot, received
parachute training, and jumped during the Second World War-was killed
when his parachute became entangled and did not adequately slow his fall.
Allegations of negligence included inadequate instruction and warnings in
connection with the type of parachute equipment in question and providing the
decedent with a parachute containing a bridle cord too long for a novice of
decedent's size and experience. 194 Apparently, plaintiff also alleged willful
misconduct based on defendant's disregard of the circumstances at the time,
although the court did not elaborate on precisely what such allegation added to
the general allegations of negligence. The court held that the plaintiff had
189 See, e.g., Barnes v. Birmingham Int'l Raceway, Inc., 551 So. 2d 929, 932 (Ala.
1989) (involves "premeditation or knowledge and consciousness that the injury is likely to
result"); Tessler & Son, Inc. v. Sonitrol Sec. Sys., 497 A.2d 530, 533 (N.J. 1985).
190 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). The Restatement requires
creation of a substantially greater risk than would be necessary to make the defendant's
conduct negligent. To this extent, recklessness differs mainly in degree from negligence.
The Restatement, in some circular reasoning, however, also states that the difference in
degree of risk contemplated by recklessness "is so marked as to amount substantially to a
difference in kind." Id. cmt. g. In another respect, the Restatement seems to require, in a
very ill-defined way, that the quality of the defendant's conduct be more culpable than
required for ordinary negligence. It requires that defendant have known or have had reason
to know of the risk, rather than that he merely should have known. Id. Thus, the
Restatement seems to vacillate between objective and subjective criteria for recklessness.
191 Boehm v. Cody County Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 712 (Wyo. 1987).
192 See, e.g., Durrell v. Parachutes Are Fun, Inc., 1987 WL 18117 (Del. Super. Ct.
1987) (applying Md. law); Buckner v. Varner, 793 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1990). Perhaps this tendency to commingle the concepts is understandable because, despite
some attempts to articulate a meaningful demarcation, in practice "there is often no clear
distinction at all between [them] ... and the two have tended to merge and take on the
same meaning." KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, § 34, at 214.
193 See Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 941 (I1. Ct. App.
1989).
19 4 Id. at 943.
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asserted sufficient allegations (whatever they were) of conscious disregard to
avoid a summary judgment based on the exculpatory agreement.195
Matters are even more uncertain when gross negligence is recognized as a
ground for invalidating an exculpatory agreement. Gross negligence is usually
defined quantitatively, as negligence "substantially and appreciably greater than
ordinary negligence." 196 It depends on whether the risk created by defendant's
conduct exceeded some imaginary line separating ordinary negligence from
gross negligence.' 97 Where that point is located is something upon which the
courts have never satisfactorily answered.' 98 Indeed, it is probably impossible
to formulate a functional demarcation separating ordinary from gross
negligence that would offer meaningful guidance to a jury.
Another case involving an injury during a recreational parachute jump
illustrates the ease with which a plaintiff can sometimes reach the jury on the
gross negligence issue, and thus on the issue of the validity of the exculpatory
agreement. 199 In denying defendant's motion for summary judgment based on
the exculpatory agreement, the court held that allegations that defendant
allowed plaintiff to parachute in winds that were a few miles per hour faster
than the maximum for a novice parachutist would (if proven) support a finding
of gross negligence.200 Not only did the court allow something as ephemeral as
a slight excess of wind speed to support its decision, but it also relied on a very
weak factual record to justify its denial of summary judgment.20'
The problem with invalidating exculpatory agreements for more serious
kinds of unintentional conduct is that it assumes we can know what
195 Id. at 946.
196 Liberty Furniture v. Sonitrol of Spokane, 770 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Wash. Ct. App.
1989) (citation omitted).
197 Id. at 1088.
198 See Sheldon D. Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 S. CAL. L. REV. 91, 121-22
(1933).
199 See Durrell v. Parachutes Are Fun, Inc., 1987 WL 18117 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 8,
1987) (applying Md. law).
200 Id. at *4.
201 The maximum wind velocity for novice parachutist was apparently established at
10 miles per hour. Id. at *3. The entry in the defendant's log indicated that the wind was 5
miles per hour. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that because the plaintiff, a novice
parachutist, had estimated that the wind speed during his first jump was 2-4 miles per hour,
and that the wind speed for his second jump was three or four times that of his first jump,
by extrapolation one might find that the wind speed during the second jump was a minimum
of 6-12 miles per hour and a maximum of 8-16 miles per hour. Id. Even if one accepts
plaintiffs estimates, it is at best only possible that the wind speed exceeded the maximum
for novice parachutists. Even apart from the very questionable probative force of plaintiff's
proof, if the disregard of a sudden increase in wind velocity of as little as 1 mile per hour
constitutes gross negligence, is there any degree of negligence that could not arguably be
deemed gross?
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recklessness and gross negligence are and how they differ from ordinary
negligence. The truth is that it is impossible to know for sure when conduct
crosses such illusory boundaries. Nor is it clear why such conduct should be
singled out for deterrence beyond that contemplated by the parties, and not
conduct that constitutes ordinary negligence. These amorphous forms of
heightened negligence should be subject to exculpation. This is especially so in
situations involving volunteers, when the danger of risky behavior motivated
by greed is absent.
B. Noncontractual Express Assumption of Risk
The Restatement has recognized a "noncontractual" dimension of
exculpatory agreements which it conceptualizes as express assumption of
risk.202 Apart from eliminating a possible contractual requirement for
consideration, it is unclear how "noncontractual" express assumption of risk
differs from a "contractual" exculpatory agreement. Although both would
require that the risks waived be included within the scope of the express
assumption of risk or exculpatory agreement, neither would apparently require
the kind or at least level of subjective appreciation of the risks that traditionally
had been required for implied assumption of risk.203
When an exculpatory agreement is held to be inapplicable, invalid, or
voidable, defendant may attempt to assert, alternatively, that the agreement
nevertheless constitutes noncontractual express assumptions of risk. It is
unlikely, however, that such a defense would prevail when the exculpatory
agreement was deemed inapplicable, invalid, or unenforceable.20 4 Although
there is little law on point, courts refusing to enforce exculpatory agreements
against minors would probably also be reluctant to allow parents expressly to
assume on behalf of their children the risks of negligent conduct. Furthermore,
if defendant relied on implied assumption of risk, subjective appreciation of the
risks in question would have to be shown or the requirements of contributory
negligence satisfied when implied assumption of risk has been incorporated into
the contributory or comparative negligence defense.
202 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B, cmt. a (1965).
203 See id. § 496D & cmt. a (distinguishing express assumption of risk or agreements
to assume risks from implied assumption of risk). The plaintiffs perception of the risks
may, however, sometimes be factored into the analysis of the scope and public policy
aspects of exculpatory agreements (and express assumption of risks). See generally supra
parts IV.A.2.a, c, and d.
204 See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 974
(Wash. 1988) (en bane) ("If the release is against public policy... it is also against public
policy to say that the plaintiff has assumed that particular risk.").
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V. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATiVE APPROVAL OF EXCULPATORY
AGREEMENTS
A. Proposal
I propose the following approach to exculpatory agreements for volunteers
and nonprofit entities providing services in youth activities. First, I recommend
that such agreements, including standardized agreements, be held valid when
executed by a parent or guardian on behalf of a minor-participant in such
activities (with the concurrence of the minor if mature), subject only to an
exception for intentionally caused injuries. Second, such a rule should be
approved by state statutes.
B. Justifications for Proposal
1. Need for Exculpation
a. Benefits of Exculpatory Agreements
In order to determine whether exculpatory agreements for volunteers are
needed, one must compare the benefits of such agreements to the costs. A
bedrock principle in tort law is that "[a] loss should lie where it has happened
to fall unless some affirmative public good will result from shifting it."205 I
believe the benefits of such agreements overwhelmingly outweigh their putative
costs. In analyzing this question, we must bear in mind that we do not have
here simply a choice between immunized versus non-immunized volunteers.
Rather, it is between immunized volunteers and no volunteers at all.
i. Need for Volunteers
The most compelling justification for the preceding proposal is the need for
volunteers in organized activities for young people. This justification really
depends on three premises. The first premise is that there is a continuing need
for recreational activities for America's youth. This proposition is indisputable
and has been addressed elsewhere. 20 6
The second is that volunteers fulfill an essential role in such activities. The
numbers speak for themselves. 20 7 It is inconceivable how anywhere near the
current magnitude of youth activities could be sustained (et alone increased)
205 CLARENCE MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 9 (1st ed. 1953).
206 See supra part II and accompanying text.
207 See supra part 11 and accompanying text.
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without the efforts of unpaid volunteers. Admittedly, there are some activities
for youth that are financed by essentially hiring people to provide the activities.
Nevertheless, paid individual providers comprise a distinct minority of persons
providing such services. For example, the American Youth Soccer
Organization is largely staffed by unpaid volunteers, 208 as is the Little
League. 2°9 It is doubtful that many of the families of these youths could afford
to or at least would be willing to allocate the funds required to support such
programs if all current volunteers had to be hired and fairly compensated. Even
in the case of paid coaches or instructors, the activities are often supported by
volunteer assistants who are not paid. Moreover, it is at the very least
important, if not preferred, that adults managing youth activities be primarily
motivated to serve young people rather than-to receive economic rewards.
The final premise is that in the long-term the continued willingness of
volunteers to serve in youth activities as well as their effectiveness will depend
on the availability of valid exculpatory agreements. Although there is little
empirical data, many knowledgeable sources believe that the threat of tort
liability has begun to seriously erode the pool of active and potential
volunteers.210 Tort claims against everyone, including volunteers, are
increasing. 211 Moreover, the outcome of tort litigation is often unpredictable,
based more on "luck and emotion than on need and reason." 212 Tort law
increasingly "makes systematic, affirmative choice impossible [because] [n]o
positive safety judgment is ever really final in the courts; there is no such thing
as a definitive bill of health. "213 It has been said that the outcome of tort cases
208 This organization, with over 400,000 members, apparently has only about 19 paid
staff members who are presumably based at the national headquarters and who perform
ongoing administrative functions. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 20743 (25th ed.
Gale Res. Inc. 1991).
209 The Little League has over 2.5 million members, but a paid staff of only 70. See
id. at 20180.
210 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text; SUGARMAN, supra note 67, at 18
("The fear of lawsuits can cause well-trained and qualified people to avoid or flee the work
they otherwise would prefer to do, or at least to resist innovation and reasonable risk taking
on the job.").
211 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the
Insitutefor Cvil Justice, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 481-82, 489 (1987) (reporting increases in
non-auto personal injury cases); George L. Priest, 71w Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1532 (1987); Jeffrey O'Connell, Less Torturous
Torts, 89 BEST'S REVIEw 35, 38 (April 1989). But see generally Marc Galanter, Reading
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And 7hnk We Know) About
our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4 (1983)
(questioning the proof of a litigation explosion).
2 12 JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 54 (1975).
213 HUBER, supra note 67, at 209.
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has the predictability of the route of a "bus steered by a fractious committee of
its passengers." 214 In tort cases decided by juries, we have the equivalent of a
brand new fractious committee with each new claim.
Irrespective of the statistical likelihood of a volunteer actually being sued,
the perception of the threat remains and may be more important than the
reality. It is not hard to guess why. The supply of volunteers is very elastic.
Volunteers do not have to serve in order to feed and house themselves and their
families. There is no mandatory "draft" of volunteers into public service, at
least not yet. The main ingredient of a volunteer's contribution is time, and
there are always other demands on a person's time that vigorously compete
with volunteer activities. It is little wonder then that a decision to devote time
and energy to a volunteer activity is a precarious one. The perceived threat of
having one's financial security arbitrarily obliterated by tort litigation215 may
often be the factor that tips the delicate balance in the calculus against service.
These considerations may weigh most heavily on those volunteers most in tune
with such trends. "[Tjhe best and the brightest recognize this more quickly
than the rest, and being more mobile in any event, they get out of the way
soonest... [and] [t]he world is a more dangerous place as a result." 216 The
alternative is that youth activities will not be offered, will not be affordable by
most youth, or will have to be offered primarily by the government-"the most
common provider of last resort." 217
The insinuation of the threat of tort liability into the volunteer activity may
also affect the quality of those services. We have seen the insidious effects of
the threat of liability in other fields. The practice of "defensive medicine" 21s
inspired by the threat of malpractice claims is one obvious example. Not only
have defensive practices in response to a fear of claims greatly increased the
costs of medical services, they have also sometimes increased the risks to
patients and frequently so poisoned the professional relationship that the overall
effectiveness of the treatment was compromised. The threat of liability may
similarly subvert the relationships between volunteers (those who have not been
discouraged from participating at all) and the young people they serve.
214 Id.
215 It is important to remember that even if a defendant ultimately prevails in a lawsuit,
the costs of attorney fees may alone prove financially ruinous.
216 HUBER, supra note 67, at 164. Huber has also observed that "[w]hen it comes to
liability problems, the bold innovators are the most fleet-footed of potential defendants.
More often than not, they adjusted to the threat of liability by doing less." Id. at 155.
217 Id. at 165.
218 See KING, supra note 138, at 320.
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ii. Autonomy and Freedom of Contract
In addition to encouraging volunteers, the validation of exculpatory
agreements protects individual autonomy and the freedom to contract.
Admittedly, there may and perhaps should be some limits on market-
alienability. 219 But the question for present purposes is not whether there
should be some limits on alienability in general, but what those limits are. One
commentator suggests that things that ar important to personhood should be
market-inalienable220 and that whether something should be market-inalienable
ultimately rests on our best conception of "human flourishing" and what will
best promote it.221 The same author concedes, however, that there is. no
"magic formula" that will delineate with certainty when something is market-
inalienable.222
There are compelling reasons for holding that prospective tort remedies
against volunteers should be "alienable" to the extent of allowing them to be
amenable to exculpatory agreements. First, it is probably more accurate to view
an exculpatory agreement, especially in this context, not as a manifestation of a
thing being "sold," but as a redefinition of a prospective consensual
relationship. This is too often overlooked by the courts, whose attitudes toward
exculpatory agreements are emblematic of a more general tendency to treat
consumer contracts as flypaper, 223 with the consumer possessing no free will at
all.
Second, the thing relinquished-the possibility of bringing a tort claim
against a volunteer for unintentional injures-is simply less crucial to
personhood than the interest in having available the activities and relationships
that depend on volunteers. The importance of these activities and relationships
to development of individual freedom, identity, and relation to the
"environment of things and other people"224-to human flourishing in other
words-patently outweighs the interest in the enervating225 and indefinite
prospects of tort claims against volunteers. There are, after all, risks to our
children in inaction-"[i]t may well be the things you don't do that defeat
219 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
The author states that "[s]omething that is market-inalienable is not to be sold, which in our
economic system means it is not to be traded in the market." Id. at 1850.
220 See id. at 1903.
221 See id. at 1903, 1937.
222 Id. at 1937.
223 HuBER, supra note 67, at 30.
224 Radin, supra note 219, at 1904.
225 On the emotional, financial, and social costs of suing, see generally Judith A.
McMorrow, Who Owns Rigts: Waiving and Settling Private Rights of Action, 34 VILL. L.
REV. 429, 451-52 (1989).
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you."226 Nor is it accurate to equate the preservation of the "right" to sue with
enhanced autonomy. It is specious to assume that litigants are masters of their
fate when it comes to tort litigation. The tort system may exploit and alienate
tort victims. 227 One need only reflect on the assault on personhood that may
occur as the pressures mount on litigants to sign contingent fee agreements; to
settle those claims that are costly to litigate; to recollect and testify in ways that
facilitate recovery; and, to submit to medical examination and procedures
calculated to inflate damages.
Third, validating exculpatory agreements executed by parents on behalf of
their children is consistent with the role accorded parents regarding the whole
spectrum of fundamental decisions affecting their children. As one
commentator asked rhetorically, "Why should one element of that set of
choices-the terms of compensation if matters go awry-be immune from
parental choice?" 228
Fourth, exculpatory agreements represent a small step in the direction of
returning control of relationships to the parties to those relationships. They may
also help to bridle the monstrously inefficient "safety tax" 229 imposed on
virtually all activity by the tort-litigation system. Exculpatory agreements may
also begin to assuage the "pernicious moral effect of America's growing fear of
risk... [with its] commensurate diminution of the notion of individual
responsibility for one's actions." 23 0 As Peter Huber observed, "The common
sense of an earlier jurisprudence suggested that the contingency of an accident
should be addressed ahead of time, when tempers are cool and minds clear." 231
Fifth, possible concerns about the inadequacy of information possessed by
parties to exculpatory agreements-and thus about how truly informed the
agreement was-are largely groundless in the context of youth activities. Given
common understanding of the inherent risks of such activities, parents will
often possess information comparable to that possessed by volunteers.
Moreover, risks may be affected by factors peculiar to individual participants,
such as the fact that a youth suffers from hemophilia, allergies, diabetes,
rheumatic heart disease, or epilepsy, for example. In addition, various
psychological dynamics may actually cause people to overestimate risks. An
2 2 6 MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAvsKY, RISK AND CULTURE 27 (1982).
227 See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 789 (1990).
228 Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice:
7he irginia Obstetrical No-Fault Statute, MED. PROF. LIABILrrY AND THE DELIVERY OF
OBSTErRICAL CARE 115, 121 (Victoria P. Rostow & Roger J. Bulger, eds. 1989).
229 See Peter W. Huber, 77e Risky Business of Liability Law, REASON, Apr. 1989, at
20; see also Henry Fairlie, Fear of Living, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 1989, at 16 ("tort
tax").
230 Fairlie, supra note 229, at 16.
231 Huber, supra note 229, at 20-21.
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"availability heuristic" 232 may cause people "to weigh disproportionately
information with high salience, memorability, or currency."233
Sixth, concerns about the level of freedom of those entering into
standardized contracts is probably exaggerated. There is always the option of
declining to participate in a specific activity. Moreover, the risks of injury
attributable to negligence by volunteers in such activities constitutes a relatively
small part of the overall calculus of risks that threaten our youth today. 234
Furthermore, the efficiency of standardized contracts in the tight budgetary
world of nonprofit activities for youth is certainly a factor to be considered. 23 5
It would be unrealistic to expect a volunteer to engage in atomistic negotiations
and contract formation with each family of a child participating in a youth
activity.
Finally, and fundamentally, even if the threat of tort liability might make
most individual volunteers more careful (which I seriously doubt), exculpatory
agreements would nevertheless enhance overall safety by assuring the
continued service of volunteers, and would promote human freedom and
flourishing. As Chaffee observed, "Freedom is not safety, but opportunity." 23 6
Without volunteers, the opportunities of our children and youth will be
irrevocably narrowed.
b. Effects of Exculpation on Goals of Tort Law
Once the more important benefits of exculpatory agreements have been
identified, the next question becomes whether these benefits outweigh the costs.
In order to assess those costs, the goals of tort law2 3 7 and the effect of valid
exculpatory agreements upon them have to be examined. Professor Stewart has,
in a thoughtful essay, criticized torts critics essentially for taking an overly
systemic, one-dimensional view of the appropriate "cure" for the failings of the
torts system. 23 8 Stewart urges a more particularized approach, based on a
comparative analysis of the potential performance of different institutions in
advancing the goals of the torts system.2 39 My proposal falls within the spirit
232 Robinson, supra note 168, at 189.
233 Id. See supra note 171.
234 See infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
235 See generally Robinson, supra note 168, at 185.
236 HUBER, supra note 67, at 219 (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Press Under
Pressure, NIEMAN REP., Apr. 1948, at 19).
237 For a summary and critical evaluation of the ostensible goals of tort law, see
SUGARMAN, supra note 67; Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 558 (1985).
238 See Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 184, 185 (1987).
239 See id. at 186.
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of Stewart's thesis. More specifically, I think that in the context of relationships
between individual volunteers and minors participating in organized youth
activities, the allocation of losses attributable to unintentional conduct should be
largely subject to antecedent agreements by the parents, volunteers, and
sponsoring institutions. I believe that even if tort law is a compensation system
worth preserving in its present form for some other contexts, the importance of
volunteers to youth activities and the roles of exculpatory agreements in
sustaining those volunteers outweigh the perceived benefits of the imposition of
unbridled potential tort liability in this setting.
i. Deterrence and Reduction of Accidents
Because the tort system of compensation is notoriously inefficient, 240
especially when compared to other systems for compensating persons in need
of disability and medical benefits, apologists for tort law often fall back on the
goal of deterrence to defend the system. Essentially, the argument goes, tort
law is useful because the threat of liability-that "benign shadow of the
law" 241-deters unacceptable conduct. 242 The value of tort liability based
deterrence, especially in the context of volunteer liability, is however doubtful
for a number of reasons.
First, it is impossible conceptually to reconcile the deterrence and
compensation objectives of tort law. Simply put, the level of liability that it
takes to deter will seldom coincide with what is necessary to compensate. Torts
scholars are inexorably coming to realize that "attempts to pursue deterrence
objectives and compensation ... objectives simultaneously through a single
legal instrument. .. entail unresolvable contradictions." 243
Second, as a general proposition, one can question the effectiveness of tort
law as a deterrent.244 In personal injury tort cases today the outcomes are so
unpredictable that a person is afforded no real guidance on how some future
240 See infra part V.B. 1.b.ii.
241 Marc Galanter, 7he Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 32
(1986) (citing Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: he Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)).
242 See id. at 14. Some defenders of the deterrence goals of tort law appear most
concerned with controlling "remote" and "overwhelming" actors, such as corporations. Id.
at 14. Presumably, then, there would be less need for deterrence (even if it worked) for
actors engaged in more direct relationships with the persons injured.
243 Michael I. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North
American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Crisis, 24 SAN DiEGo L. REV.
929, 929 (1987).
244 SUGARMAN, supra note 67, at 3-20.
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jury will choose to characterize one's conduct. 245 People are often ignorant of
the few relevant legal principles regarding potential tort liability. Many people
such as volunteers will often have a relatively short-term involvement with the
activity in question and will seldom be in a position to systematically evaluate
and react246 to the risks of liability. Furthermore, to the extent the threat of
liability elicits any response at all, it is frequently action aimed not so much at
reducing the risk of injury as the risk of being sued.247
Third, the threat of liability can often produce undesirable results. It may
over-deter, 248 with the obvious effect of discouraging unpaid volunteers from
participating at all. When deterrence operates to eliminate committed
volunteers, the void may be filled by the phenomenon of the "do-it-
yourselfer." 249 This phenomenon has been illustrated in a number of other
contexts, perhaps most strikingly in the products liability setting. The threat of
liability might induce ladder manufacturers, for example, to stop manufacturing
ladders. This in turn may force people to use the more dangerous kitchen chair
instead of a ladder when they replace a bulb. 25 0
In the volunteer context, the scout master may be sued for letting a scout
singe his fingers by getting too close to a campfire. Perhaps liability would
reduce the incidence of campfire-related injuries. The reason, however, would
not be because tort law engendered greater care around campfires (which it
probably would not), but because we would have fewer campfires because
there would be fewer volunteers willing to work with scouts. More
245 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. Moreover, many collateral factors may
influence the outcome of personal injury litigation. For example, a recent account of a trial
attributed the fact that a verdict was several million dollars under a pretrial estimate to the
fact that the jurors observed plaintiff's attorney arrive at the courthouse in a red Porsche.
See David Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1991, at B18. There have also been
recent reports of alleged manufacturing of evidence, falsifying of documents, and bribing of
witnesses in personal injury cases. See, e.g., Edward Frost, Top P.L Lawyer Convicted,
A.B.A.J., May 1991, at 28. See generally "Recovered" Litigant Faces Fraud Charges,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 1991, at A10 (news reports of fraud charges
brought against a patient who had recovered a $2.25 million award in a malpractice case).
The "standards" of tort law have been criticized as morally incoherent and inconsistent. See
Abel, supra note 227, at 793. About the only conclusion that can confidently be made about
jury decisions is that we know very little about how juries make their determinations. See
Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: 7he Process of Decision Making, 52 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (1989).
246 Even when people are aware of the potential "sting" of liability, most will "find
that, from time to time, they simply cannot make their way safely through the [liability]
maze." Sugarman, supra note 237, at 568.
247 HUBER, supra note 67, at 164.
248 Sugarman, supra note 237, at 581.
249 See generally HUBER, supra note 67, at 166; Huber, supra note 229, at 24.
250 Huber, supra note 229, at 24.
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importantly, you may then find more of our youth solitudinous and alienated.
Moreover, we may find a variation of the do-it-yourselfer, as other outlets fill
the void in young lives. While a young person may not be exposed to the
sparks of a campfire, he may be incinerated attempting to freebase cocaine. The
net effect of the threat of tort liability hardly reduces accidents unless the only
accidents we, in our selective myopia, are worried about are those induced by
campfires. Given the proliferation of single-parent families and apparent dearth
of available time for parental involvement in many activities, other activities
may be substituted for organized youth activities. These frequently would, as
experience demonstrates daily, often involve violence, crime, and substance
abuse.
Fourth, on a more diffuse level, deterrence as a manifestation of our search
for a risk-free society, may have a more pernicious effect in its "commensurate
diminution of the notion of individual responsibility for one's actions." 251
Fifth, if the safety and well-being of minors is our concern, it is specious
to believe that those interests can be most effectively advanced by the blunt
instrument of tort-mediated deterrence directed at volunteers. Not only is
deterrence in such a context largely illusory, it may be counterproductive. Not
only is there the risk of over-deterrence (discussed above), but the "monopoly
of force"25 2 represented by the tort system will often undermine collective
action in other forms that would be more effective in enhancing the health and
well-being of our youth. Injuries constitute one of the leading causes of
mortality among American children under 19 years of age,253 but the conduct
of volunteers is not in any meaningful way implicated as a leading cause of
such injuries. 254 If we are committed to reduction of the toll of injuries to our
children, we should address the fact that 15-30 percent of motor vehicle crashes
and 40-50 percent of drownings-the first and fourth leading causes of fatal
injuries to children-are associated with alcohol use.25 5 Rule changes in some
251 Fairlie, supra note 229, at 16.
252 Abel, supra note 227, at 790.
253 Fatal Injuries to Children-United States, 1986, 39 MoRBIDrrY & MORTALrrY
WKLY. REP. 442 (1990), reprinted in 264 J.A.M.A. 952 (1990) (hereinafter cited as Fatal
Injuries, subsequent citations will be to the J.A.M.A.).
254 These leading causes include: motor vehicle crashes, homicides, suicides,
drownings, and fire-related injuries. Id. at 952.
255 Id. Motor vehicle-related deaths of our youth could also be significantly reduced by
taking steps to assure that motorcycle operators and riders wear helmets. Twelve percent of
the motor vehicle deaths on public highways each year involve people riding motorcycles.
See Daniel M. Sosin, M.D., et al., Head Injury-Associated Deaths from Motorcycle
Crashes, 264 J.A.M.A. 2395 (1990). Safety helmets are effective in reducing the incidence
and severity of such motorcycle-related head injuries. Id. Suing or threatening to sue
volunteers will have no impact on motorcycle injuries, but helmets will.
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sports could, as has been demonstrated in high school football, 25 6 reduce the
incidence of serious injuries to participants. We might also consider that most
homicides257 and suicides258 (the second and third leading causes of fatal
injuries) involved firearms. 259 Driving away our volunteers will not take the
place of concerted action to address such injury-promoting problems as alcohol
abuse and the proliferation of handguns in our society.
The process of exculpation may also operate to reduce accidents to children
in other ways. For example, it may galvanize parents into more active roles in
their children's activities. This may include not only direct participation, but
also more thoughtful evaluation of the quality of volunteer activity and the
overall value of the recreational experience. The supposed deterrent effects of
tort law are much less effective in controlling injurious behavior in the
volunteer context than other potential forces such as a person's sense of self-
preservation, consumer demand forces, personal morality, and thoughtful
government regulation. 260 The continued presence of public-spirited volunteers
contributes to the flourishing of these forces.
Sixth, the perceived threat of liability may also produce other deleterious
effects, such as inducing concealment of injury-causing events because of a
perceived risk of liability. 261 Such reactions to potential liability could be
especially damaging in the case of young persons who are less able to promptly
evaluate and mitigate serious conditions than are adults.
And finally, even if the threat of tort liability were to somehow be
conveyed to volunteers in a comprehensible form, it is doubtful that most
accidents involving participants in youth activities would be avoided by the
exercise of "reasonable" care by volunteers unless the concept of
reasonableness has been elevated beyond any realistic human paradigm.
256 See Current Trends, Football-Related Spinal Cord Injuries Among High School
Players-Loulsiana, 1989,39 MORBIDrrY AND MORTALrrY WKLY. REP. 586 (1990).
257 Homicide is the second leading cause of injury among young people. See Fatal
Injuries, supra note 253, at 952.
258 Suicide is the third leading cause of fatal injuries among children. Fatal Injuries,
supra note 253, at 952; see also Susan J. Blumenthal, M.D., Youth Suicide: 7he Physician's
Role in Suicide Prevention, 264 J.A.M.A. 3194 (1990). In targeting suicide for
intervention, special attention must be paid to the child's environment and support system.
See id. at 3196. The problem of youth suicide demands a broad based effort addressing the
family, the schools, primary care physicians, as well as the socio-economic conditions that
have fostered a sense of hopelessness among our youth. Volunteers may play a role in this
collective effort, but those efforts will not be enhanced at all by injecting tort litigation here.
In fact, it would simply remove volunteers as one potential support system for our young
people.
259 Fatal Injuries, supra note 253, at 952.
2 60 See generally SUGARMAN, supra note 67, at 4-7.
261 See Abel, supra note 227, at 814; SUGARMAN, supra note 67, at 19.
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I. Compensation and Loss Spreading
Two important goals of tort law are compensation and loss spreading. By
requiring tortious actors to compensate their victims, tort law is supposed to
avoid or at least mitigate the potentially devastating effects of an accidental
injury on its victim. An accidental loss can be borne with less rending of the
social fabric when the loss is distributed in small portions throughout a large
group rather than borne entirely by the individual victim and his family.
There are several problems with these goals, especially in the context of
volunteer liability. First, tort law, as a compensation system, is beset by
extravagant administrative costs. 262 Less than one-half of the money devoted to
tort liability actually reaches the victim, the rest goes to the attorneys,
insurance administrators, expert witnesses, and others involved in the loss-
shifting process. 263 Moreover, what money does reach the plaintiffs will often
go to pay inflated pain and suffering and sometimes punitive damages claims of
some victims, sometimes leaving the rest of the injured persons without
remedy. Only 10-15 percent of such funds compensate for loss of earnings,
medical expenses, and other economic losses.264 In a world of limited
resources, this level of compensatory inefficiency is incompatible with any
honest concern for the welfare of the class of persons tort law professes to
serve.
265
Second, tort liability fails to help many persons who suffer accidental
injuries. Often, despite imaginative lawyering, there will be no credible
tortfeasor to sue,2 66 at least not one sufficiently wealthy or insured to satisfy
most tort judgments,267 especially under such a profligate system.
Third, individualized damages in tort law reflecting each victim's pre-
accident earning potential have been criticized as sustaining existing levels of
wealth and income by insulating them from the leavening effects of
accidents. 268 Individualized damages in effect legitimize existing income
distribution and the "intergenerational reproduction of inequality." 269 Thus,
there is a question of the fairness of a system that distributes losses throughout
262 See SUGARMAN, supra note 67, at 40.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 One commentator observed: "'If I were a cynic, I would say that if this is a social
insurance system, it is being run primarily to benefit the trial bar.'" See Sugarman, supra
note 237, at 596 n.184 (quoting J. Henderson).
266 Sugarman, supra note 237, at 593.
267 Abel, supra note 227, at 796.
268 Id. at 799, 803.
269 Id. at 803.
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a broad class of people, but defines those losses in a way that favors the more
economically fortunate members of the society. 270
Fourth, even if one were to accept in principle the compensatory goals of
tort law, the class of defendants consisting of individual volunteers is an
inappropriate one through which to redistribute and spread losses. Volunteers
are, by definition, not engaged in a business whereby they can readily impose
charges and adjust prices to reflect anticipated losses.
Nor is liability insurance the answer. Liability insurance may simply not be
available, at least not at affordable prices, or a defendant's liability may exceed
the limits of his insurance coverage, especially given the unpredictability of
pain and suffering and punitive damages. Moreover, even if available, the
charges for liability insurance may be prohibitive. High insurance premiums
are an inevitable consequence of the inherent unpredictability of damages in
personal injury litigation. Justice O'Connor recently commented that punitive
damages, for example, "'seem to be limited only by the ability of lawyers to
string zeros together in drafting a complaint.'" 271 Sooner or later Americans
must pay for these zeros, although that reality seems sadly to have eluded a
majority of the Court.
One might contend that the solution is simply to have the organization
sponsoring the youth activities obtain liability insurance for its volunteers, but
someone has to pay for the insurance premiums. Many youth activities would
be unable to continue, at least if required to obtain liability insurance at a level
that provided meaningful protection for its volunteers. In essence, youth
activities would become available only to the affluent, and even for affluent
young people the experience would be commercialized and adulterated. The
absence of volunteers would reinforce the impression in our young people that
for them, adult time, attention, and caring must be purchased.
270 Critics of the tort system have argued (with merit) that the much more efficient
first-party insurance should be used in place of the tort (third-party insurance) loss spreading
system. HUBER, supra note 67, at 225. Defenders of the tort system might argue that more
universal first-party insurance would operate to spread losses over an even broader
population than tort law does, and therefore would suffer even more from one of the same
criticisms that the tort system does-that it would preserve economic stratifications at the
expense of a large group. There are, however, two reasons why first-party insurance would
be more fair than the tort system. First, it presumably would be paid for by the victim. And
second, most first-party insurance, if affordable, would not replace all of an accident
victim's future economic loss, and thus would not sustain individual economic stratification
as does the tort system. Moreover, the extent that it replaced such losses would depend on
the level of insurance purchased.
271 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1066 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting OKI Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir.
1989) (Kozinski, I., concurring)).
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A typical rejoinder to many of these criticisms is that without tort liability,
the costs of maintaining and treating the accident victims will have to be paid
by the taxpayers. This facile argument ignores the crucial fact that even under
the tort system the cost will also end up being distributed beyond the immediate
defendant. If the defendant is insured, at least part of the loss will be spread
throughout the class of insureds through insurance premiums and the increased
costs for the services that defray them. If a defendant is not insured or not
otherwise sufficiently affluent to pay a judgment, taxpayers may still have to
help support victims of accidents who are unable to support themselves. We
live in a world of finite resources. Victims as a class will receive much less
help under a tort system that returns such a small percentage of each dollar of
insurance premium (or dollar payout) than would be true under a more efficient
system, such as first-party insurance. About 13 million American children have
neither health insurance nor coverage under Medicaid.272 For about $10 to $12
billion, adequate health insurance could be provided for these children.273
Tort liability directed at volunteers may divert precious resources away
from the goal of helping our young victims of accidents. If tort liability in this
context helps anyone, it is primarily the members of the legal profession.
in. Loss Allocation
Tort law also supposedly performs a loss allocative function by forcing up
the costs for goods and services that engendered the losses, thereby informing
consumers of the "true costs" of those goods and services. There are several
problems with this ostensible justification for tort law. First, in a fault-based
system of liability, many losses attributable to an activity would not result in
liability because there would be no negligence or intentional injury. Second,
even when there is liability, it is doubtful that insurance premiums are or even
could be sufficiently experience-rated, especially for individual volunteers, to
accurately reflect the recurring risks of those activities. 274 Finally, volunteer
activities are not ordinarily sufficiently integrated into an economic enterprise
to internalize losses and systematically reflect them in the prices for the services
rendered. To the extent that we moved in the direction of an economic pricing
structure for youth activities, we would defeat the whole idea of a volunteer-
driven activity.
272 B.D. Colen, Our 13 Million Uninsured ahidren, NEWSDAY, May 2, 1989, at 13.
273 Id.
274 Sugarman, supra note 237, at 616 n.267.
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iv. Signaling
The deterrence-educating role of loss allocation is sometimes
conceptualized in terms of a "signaling" function.275 Tort liability supposedly
sends a signal, informing members of society of expected levels of conduct.
Unfortunately, the fault-based component of tort law seldom transmits useful
signals apart from a general admonition to act "reasonably." Those cases not
settled, are usually decided by juries, whose decisions are "secretly reached,
unexplained, and inconsistent in result." 276 The only clear signal a volunteer is
likely to receive from news of a tort claim against one of his peers is that the
best way-perhaps the only way-to avoid liability is to opt out of volunteer
activities and stay home.
v. Fairness and Corrective Justice
Another goal of tort liability is to promote fairness and corrective
justice.277 Tort law is supposed to reallocate a loss between the victim and
tortfeasor when it is fair and morally just to do so. Professor Stewart refers to
this as redressing the moral disequilibrium caused by a defendant's tortious
conduct.278 This justification for tort liability is specious for unintentional
injuries, especially in the context of volunteers. It is seldom fair to subject a
person's financial security to the arbitrariness of the tort system, with its
surreal "reasonableness" standards and ephemeral juries, for unintentional
injuries. A person may, in retrospect, be deemed to have engaged in
unreasonable conduct, yet hardly be morally at fault or, as a matter of fairness,
even the party who should bear a loss. Moreover, the amount of damages often
produces moral incoherence2 79 because only rarely will the amount of
compensatory damages reflect the "fault" or true blameworthiness of the
defendant (even if we could agree on a comprehensible definition of fault).
Should the scoutmaster, exhausted from long hours at work earlier in the day,
who momentarily is distracted, be liable when one youth is burned because
another youth decides to make a campfire spew sparks? Might a jury find, in
evaluating selective recollections after the event, that the scoutmaster failed to
adequately instruct or supervise his scouts? Is it indeed fair to subject this
volunteer to years of haunting self-reproach and fear of financial ruin
engendered by litigation, and ultimately perhaps to the loss of his financial
275 See generally Sugarman, supra note 237, at 611-13; Abel, supra note 227, at 803-
06.
276 Sugarman, supra note 237, at 612.
277 See generally id. at 603-09.
278 Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Lav? 77Te Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CFH.
L. REV. 184, 186 (1987).
279 Abel, supra note 227, at 791; see Trebilcock, supra note 243.
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security? Why is it not fair instead to allow the scoutmaster and the parents of
the scouts to agree in advance on how to allocate responsibility for these
unintentional injuries?280
Once one passes beyond the level of almost meaningless generality of
"reasonableness," there is no comprehensible objective litmus to guide a
fairness-based imposition of liability. Many accidents arising in youth activities
in which volunteers are present will have little to do with the volunteers. Often
accidents are the result of individual thrill seeking28 l or the materialization of
unavoidable risks inherent in an activity. We cannot avoid some baseball
players being hit by balls, some soccer players being kicked in the shins, some
scouts tumbling down a hill, without so changing the essential nature of the
activity so much that it would be diluted into oblivion.
vi. Justiciability-Feasibility and Appropriateness of Tort Remedies
One should also consider the feasibility and appropriateness of imposing
tort liability in this setting. Activities involving young persons are inherently
unpredictable. Attempts to fix blame or even to establish causation for injuries
arising out of such activities is difficult at best. Professor Henderson has
characterized issues in at least some types of tort claims as polycentric because
of "the nonlinear way in which the issues in such problems are interrelated." 282
One of the most polycentric sets of negligence issues, according to Henderson,
involves accidents arising in the context of certain types of close personal
relationships, such as that shared by family members. 283 He finds accidents
arising in such settings sufficiently polycentric to "frustrate honest attempts to
submit [them] to adjudication." ' 284 The relationship between youths and
supervising adult volunteers in recreational activities is similar in its
polycentricity. Consider, for example, the case of an "extremely hyperactive,
280 Professor Robinson has commented: "The flaws of the tort system as a moral
arbiter would seem clear enough that private parties should not be bound to submit to it."
Robinson, supra note 168, at 195.
281 Cava & Wiesner, supra note 176, at 644.
282 James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the
Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 468, 475 (1976).
283 Id. at 481, 502-05. Some courts have explicitly analogized the duty owed by
volunteers supervising youth activities to the duties and responsibilities of parents. Castro v.
Chicago Park Dist., 533 N.E.2d 504, 507 (111. App. Ct. 1988). One could argue that the
duties of parents and the duty of reasonable care are essentially the same. When, however,
a parental duty is perceived as more demanding than a duty of reasonable care, some courts
reject the parental analogy. Cf. Benitez v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 33
(N.Y. 1989) (duty to participants in interscholastic high school athletic program is
reasonable care to protect participant from unassumed, concealed, or unreasonable risks).
284 Henderson, supra note 282, at 502.
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compulsively adventuresome" Boy Scout who fell off a precipice at Columbia
Gorge while trying to lower himself without permission. 285 Or, what about a
Little League baseball player who is struck by an errant ball while he was
sitting in the grass to tie his shoe?286 In retrospect, the steps that could have
been taken to have averted the accident are limited only by the bounds of the
imagination of the attorneys. Were there rules against shoe tying at this
location? Was the field chosen or designed with reasonable care? Should all
movement of balls have been suspended anytime anyone sat on the ground?
Should there have been warning signs? Where? Saying what? This complexity
and lack of certainty in the milieu of youth activities militates against
application of traditional tort liability principles and is a justification for
validating exculpatory agreements. 287
In general, society seems to be growing less tolerant of risk, at least those
risks that another person has had a hand in creating or for which the victim can
rationalize away his own responsibility. 288 Unfortunately, this too often results
in a blurring of the line that separates bad luck attributable to someone's
negligence from bad luck not attributable to negligence.
2. Need for Statutory Enabling Legislation
If exculpatory agreements applicable to minors participating in youth
activities are to protect and reassure volunteers, such agreements should be
authorized by statute. There are several reasons for this. First, judicial attitudes
toward exculpatory agreements for minors have often been either negative289 or
too unpredictable to be confidently relied upon. Exculpatory agreements in
general have also been subject to scrutiny under a public policy analysis. 290
While agreements in the context of recreational activities have, with respect to
adult claimants, usually been held not to violate public policy, the standards for
making the public policy analysis are so vague that one can never be sure how
such agreements will fare until one is actually sued and forced to rely upon
one. The famous TunkI case admitted as much, conceding that "[n]o definition
of the concept of public interest [that would determine when an agreement
violated public policy] can be contained within the four corners of a
285 Coffey v. Hilands, 600 P.2d 466, 468 (Or. 1979).
286 Cf. Castro v. Chicago Park Dist., 533 N.E.2d 504 (111. App. Ct. 1988) (discussed
in text accompanying notes 53-57).
287 See generally Cava & Wiesner, supra note 176, at 639.
288 See, e.g., Fairlie, supra note 229, at 14.
289 See supra part IV.A.2.b.
290 See supra part IV.A.2.d.
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formula." 291 Thus, even if courts were to decide not to automatically invalidate
all exculpatory agreements by or on behalf of minors, the question of whether
the exculpatory agreement in the particular factual setting violated public policy
would remain. Matters are further obscured by other potential threats to the
validity of exculpatory agreements, especially the rules allowing avoidance of
such agreements when the injury arises out of certain types of tortious conduct.
This is especially true when mere gross negligence, in all its ill-defined
splendor, has been held sufficient to avoid an exculpatory agreement. 292 As
much as possible, the statutes should eliminate ambiguities and uncertainties
about the validity and scope of exculpatory agreements. 293
The proposal I make here is admittedly one limited in scope. It does not
address the shortcomings of tort liability with a systemic solution. Therefore,
perhaps one otherwise sympathetic to my objectives might nevertheless be
tempted to criticize the proposal as another "bandaid" 294 on the "crazy
quilt" 295 of selective law reform. The concern is that a whole series of
uncoordinated arrangements may emerge, thereby making comprehensive
reform more difficult296 or at least weakening the impetus for it. I think,
however, that this selective proposal can be defended on several grounds. First,
it will serve an important goal that transcends the general benefits of efficiency
one expects from limiting the scope of the tort system. It will help to assure the
continued willingness of volunteers to serve our young people at a time when
there is a crying need for such attention. Second, to the extent that more
systemic tort reform is warranted, my proposal may actually contribute to more
generalized law reform efforts. Selective limitations, such as the one proposed
here, incrementally reduce the net stake of those who are inclined to oppose
virtually all retrenchment of tort liability. Thus, these selective resections may
ultimately decompress opposition to meaningful tort reform so that reform on a
broader scale becomes politically feasible. Finally, a more particularized
approach to tort reform may represent the appropriate course. The nature of the
settings for human injuries varies greatly. This variousness may call for
291 Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1963). Other courts
have admitted that the policy considerations are approached on an ad hoe, case-by-case
basis. See Schlobohm v. SPA Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. 1982).
29 2 See supra part IV.A.2.g.
293 The effects of ambiguities and uncertainties on statutory limitations of liability have
been marked in other types of activities that society has attempted to promote by limiting
liability. Thus, recreational use statutes have failed to accomplish their intended goal of
providing the assurances needed to overcome landowner reluctance to open their lands. N.
Linda Goldstein et al., Recreational Use Statutes-T71me for Reforn, PROBATE &
PROPERTY, July/Aug. 1989, at 6, 8.29 4 Sugarman, supra note 237, at 618.
295 Id. at 626.
296 Id. at 627.
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particularized responses. 297 I believe that unintentional injuries arising in the
context of the volunteer-youth participant context are more appropriately
addressed by the prior allocative arrangements of the parents, participants,
volunteers, and institutional sponsors than by naked intervention of tort
liability. To the extent that injuries to young persons call for additional
responses, other institutions, such as first party health insurance and
government-supported medical care should be considered rather than
inefficient, haphazard, and counterproductive tort remedies.
It is not unusual for there to be legislative approval of agreements that
might otherwise have been invalidated or at least challenged by the parties. 298
Some states have enacted statutes allowing a parent or guardian to make
decisions on behalf of a child in certain legal matters. 299 Statutes have also
approved agreements on behalf of minors to submit some types of claims to
arbitration. 30° A number of recent decisions that have invalidated exculpatory
agreements on various grounds, including the fact that the victim was a
minor3° 1 or under a public policy analysis, 302 have expressly alluded to the
appropriateness of a legislative solution to the question.
A legislative approach has several advantages. It offers more immediate,
detailed, and resilient guidance than would be possible if one were forced to
await the confluence of the right case, procedural posture, and judicial
sensitivity to produce the desired rule.
Statutory modifications of the tort system inexorably seem to spawn
constitutional challenges. This will probably occur in response to these
proposals. The question of the constitutionality of such proposals is beyond the
scope of this article. It is hoped, nonetheless, that the courts will respect the
autonomy of children and their parents and uphold the validity of statutes
approving exculpatory agreements as proposed.
2 97 Stewart, supra note 278, at 195-96.
298 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACrs § 14 cmt. b (1979).
299 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04 (West 1990) ("[T]he parent of a child
has the following rights, privileges, duties, and powers: ... (7) the power to represent the
child in legal action and to make other decisions of substantial significance concerning the
child... ."). The applicability of this statute to exculpatory agreements is unclear.
300 See McKinstry v. Valley Ob-Gyn Clinic, P.C., 405 N.W.2d 88, 99 (Mich. 1987).
("A child can be bound by a parent's act when a statute grants that authority to a parent.").
Some courts have approved such agreements even in the absence of statutory authorization.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
301 In Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 144 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying Pa. law), while the court allowed a minor to disavow an
exculpatory agreement signed by the minor and her mother, it also recognized that the
"quagmire" created by the courts could be avoided by providing by statute that parental
consent would bind the child.
302 See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 975
(Wash. 1988).
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VI. WORKING OUT THE DETAILS
A. Who Must Sign?
An enabling statute should make it clear that, subject to the concurrence of
the minor if mature, it is sufficient if one custodial parent (or a guardian)
executes the exculpatory agreement. The Supreme Court recently held that a
two-parent notification requirement that must be satisfied in order for a minor
female to obtain an abortion was not reasonably related to a legitimate state
interest and was unconstitutional (at least in the absence of a judicial bypass
option).303 The Court emphasized, among other facts, that one out of every
two marriages ends in divorce, and that the vast majority of children will spend
some time with only one parent.30 4 The realities of one-parent and
dysfunctional families, and the need to assure some certainty and reliability in
exculpatory agreements, militate in favor of making the consent of one parent
sufficient. The statute should specify the age of those minors from whom
concurrence would have to be obtained for the releases to be valid.
B. Consideration
The volunteer's services or the granting of permission to the minor to
participate in the activity in question should be sufficient consideration to
satisfy a contractual requirement for consideration. 30 5 However, to avoid
overly technical challenges to exculpatory agreements, the statute should
expressly provide that consideration is not required to render these agreements
enforceable. 306
C. Scope of the Release
1. Language Describing Scope of Exculpation
One of the hurdles for persons drafting exculpatory agreements has been to
employ language that is deemed sufficient to inform the other party of the
303 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (Stevens, J., parts IV, VII).
304 Id. at 2945.
305 See Wilson v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 228, 231 n.5
(M.D. Pa. 1988) (applying Pa. law); Springer, supra note 121, at 495.
306 Elimination of any consideration requirement is consistent with a noncontractual
rationale for the defense based on an exculpatory agreement-one that is animated by an
extended tort concept of consent rather than contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496B cmt. a (1965).
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nature and scope of the prospective interests he is about to waive.30 7 Ideally the
statute should suggest language that the parties to the agreement could rely on
with confidence. But the suggested language should not be deemed exclusive.
In other words, the parties could, if they wished, draft language of their own.
The advantage of including suggested language, however, would be that it
would afford parties choosing to rely on it an added measure of predictability
and certainty not currently found in the case-by-case meanderings of the courts.
The statute should also state that terms that generally identify the activity in
question in a way that would inform an average person of the identity of that
activity are sufficient. There should be no requirement, at least with respect to
commonplace activities, to attempt the impossible task of detailing every risk,
location, and other permutation that a participant might encounter.
The statute should also state that the intention of the parties, as ascertained
from all of the language of the agreement, should control. There should be no
hard and fast requirement that every tort theory of liability or that certain
terms, such as "negligence," be used if the intention of the parties was to free
the defendant from liability for unintentional tortious conduct such as
negligence.
2. ypes of Conduct Subject to Exculpati6n
A statute should authorize the release of prospective liability for all
negligent and other unintentional injuries. As previously noted, courts have
frequently invalidated exculpatory agreements not only for intentional injuries,
but also for at least some of the more severe forms of unintentional tortious
conduct.308 Some courts have disallowed exculpation not only for reckless
conduct, but also for gross negligence as well. There may sometimes be a
temptation for juries to stretch things to find that higher level of fault, whatever
it is, if the alternative is to deny tort recovery to a young accident victim. To
make matters worse, a finding of recklessness may support an additional award
of punitive damages.309 Thus, the same findings inspired by pressures to avoid
the bar of an exculpatory agreement may concomitantly support an award of
punitive damages. To award such damages for unintentional injuries caused by
public-spirited volunteers is palpably unjust. The in terrorem threat of such
damages (which by definition are added on to compensatory damages) may be
the final straw leading to the dissolution of the precariously elastic supply of
potential volunteers. Under my proposal, all forms of unintentional conduct,
307 See generally supra part IV.A.2.a.
308 See supra part IV.A.2.g.
309 KEErON Er AL., supra note 1, § 2, at 9-10. A few jurisdictions may even allow
punitive damages for gross negligence, at least when equated with recklessness. Most
courts, however, require more than gross negligence. Id.
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including both recklessness (willful or wanton conduct) and gross negligence,
would be subject to exculpatory agreements. There is no really predictable or
comprehensible line separating ordinary negligence from the other more serious
forms of negligent conduct. Moreover, it would often be a question for the jury
whether defendant's conduct amounted to recklessness or gross negligence,
thereby further adding to the uncertainty.
Intentional injuries are a special concern. Traditionally, courts have held
that exculpatory agreements could not validly bar tort claims for intentionally
inflicted injuries. 310 Even if, as I have proposed, parents are empowered to
enter into binding exculpatory agreements on behalf of their minor children, no
one, volunteers or otherwise, should be free to intentionally injure a child,
notwithstanding anything a parent signs. The problem is to separate intentional
injuries that should appropriately remain subject to liability (irrespective of any
exculpatory agreement) from other merely intentional conduct that should not.
It is important to remember that intentional injuries require more than
intentional acts.
According to traditional tort doctrine, a battery may occur when one
intentionally311 causes nonconsensual impermissible contact with another that is
harmful or offensive. There is no requirement that defendant have intended to
actually harm the victim or that defendant have acted with ill-will. My concern
is that this broad definition of battery might be stretched to avoid the bar of an
exculpatory agreement. What if a coach who demonstrates a swimming stroke
by vigorously (perhaps even too vigorously) moving a young swimmer's arms
causes a sprain or some other injury? Assuming that a negligence claim was
foreclosed under my proposal by an exculpatory agreement, the coach might
still be confronted with a two-pronged argument in an intentional tort claim.
First, the plaintiff would argue that there was a battery because this intentional
contact that turned out to be harmful was nonconsensual. Were the swimmer an
adult, his consent would probably preclude liability for battery even
independent of any exculpatory agreement, but the problem is that the swimmer
was not an adult. The plaintiff might contend that the parents did not consent to
this specific type of contact-moving the swimmer's arms-and that the general
parental consent to the swimming instruction did not embrace this contact.
Second, plaintiff would attack the exculpatory agreement by arguing that this
contact was intentional and was harmful, and therefore the agreement was
ineffective. If taken to this kind of extreme, these types o.f arguments could
vitiate much of the protection that is, under my proposal, supposed to be
accorded to volunteers by exculpatory agreements.
3 10 See supra part lV.A.2.g.
311 Intent may be established by proving either that the defendant's purpose was to
cause the actionable contact (in the case of battery) or other liability-producing
consequence, or that defendant knew to a substantial certainty that it would occur.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
[Vol. 53:683
1992] EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS FOR VOLUNTEERS 753
Liability of the volunteer coach for battery in the preceding situation
should be precluded for two reasons. First, it could be argued that even
independent of the exculpatory effects of the agreement, parental consent
(manifested by the exculpatory agreement or by the parents' conduct in
presenting their child for swimming activities) constituted sufficient consent by
them to cover all the usual contacts that might be expected between the coach
and the swimmer. One might further reason that even if, arguendo, parental
consent to the activity was not specific enough to make the contact in question
consensual, it was at least sufficient to make the usual contacts inherent in an
activity permissible and therefore for that reason not actionable as a battery.
Thus, even if the contact here was intentional (thereby satisfying one of the
elements of battery), two other elements-that the contact be nonconsensual and
impermissible-were not satisfied. Second, the exculpatory agreement itself
covering unintentional injuries should include some intentional contacts when
the prerequisites for intentional torts were not satisfied. Thus, the mere fact that
some contact with a person was intended should not ipso facto make that
contact an intentional tort. Rather, all of the other required elements of that
intentional tort must also be established. Accordingly, intentionally moving a
swimmer's arms, but in a way not calculated to hurt him, should probably not
constitute an intentional tort because two required elements-that the contact
also be nonconsensual and impermissible-were not satisfied. Therefore, we do
not have an intentional tort or, for that reason, a basis for invalidating an
exculpatory agreement.
A potential soft spot in exculpatory agreements may be the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (sometimes called the tort of
outrageous conduct). This tort has been recognized as within the rule
invalidating exculpatory agreements for intentional torts.312 This amorphous
tort should not be allowed to unduly subvert the efficacy of exculpatory
agreements. Under the traditional rule, either intentionally or recklessly
inflicted mental distress has been held actionable under the so-called tort of
outrageous conduct if the other required elements were satisfied.313 Because,
under my proposed statute, allegedly reckless conduct would be subject to
exculpation, reckless infliction of emotional distress should likewise be subject
to the bar of an exculpatory agreement. Moreover, if the essence of a plaintiff's
claim is for physical injury that was not itself intended, plaintiff should
ordinarily not be permitted to circumvent the bar of an exculpatory agreement
by the simple expedient of characterizing his claim as one for intentional
infliction of emotional distress absent truly outrageous conduct. Thus, a Little
League coach might negligently continue a practice session despite the presence
of bees on the field, and a player might be stung. The coach should not lose the
3 12 See Reece v. Finch, 562 So. 2d 195, 200 (Ala. 1990).
3 13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[l
protection of an otherwise valid exculpatory agreement merely because the
plaintiff argues that it was intentional infliction of mental distress to conduct
practice on a field where bees were known to be lurking. Rather, allegations of
intentional infliction of emotional distress should not be sufficient to avoid
exculpation except in extreme cases of intentionally outrageous conduct.
Some courts have held that an exculpatory agreement may be ineffective to
bar tort claims when the conduct in question violated a statute.3 14 Given the
proliferation of statutes as well as the broad general scope of many of them,
invalidating agreements on this basis seems unwise. Under my proposal, the
mere fact that the defendant's conduct violated some statute should not for that
reason invalidate an exculpatory agreement unless the statute in question
expressly precluded exculpatory agreements in that situation.
Strict liability theories of recovery should also be subject to exculpation.
Thus, in the unlikely event that a volunteer's alleged conduct could somehow
be characterized as otherwise falling within the sphere of strict liability, it
should be subject to exculpation. This should be true whether plaintiff
attempted to rely on strict tort liability or upon some implied warranty theory.
Express contractual guarantees or express warranties should probably also be
subject to exculpation if that was the intent of the parties based on the language
of the exculpatory agreement. Thus, a statement in the document that no
guarantees or promises were made (except as expressly stated in writing) with
respect to the activity in question should ordinarily be effective to preclude a
claim based upon some contract-type of warranty theory.315 Ideally, the
enabling statute should prohibit reliance on alleged express guarantees or
warranties by a volunteer unless such promises were in writing.
Most courts have held that express assumption of risk, at least in the form
of an exculpatory agreement, is a complete bar if otherwise valid. 316 The
enabling statute should reaffirm that an exculpatory agreement, if applicable,
constitutes a complete bar to a claim. In other words, the defense would not be
subject to dilution by application of any comparative negligence statute.
314 See supra part IV.A.2.e.
315 The paradigm for cases brought under this theory for services has been in the area
of medical services. Here patients sometimes have sought to circumvent the requirements of
proof of malpractice by alleging that the health care provider had essentially guaranteed a
cure or other specific outcome of the treatment. Some states have reacted to the threat of
such claims by enacting legislation requiring that such guarantees be in writing. See
generally KING, supra note 138, at 254-59.
316 See KEErON Er AL., supra note 1, § 68, at 496.
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3. Persons and Entities Covered-Scope of the Waiver
a. Individual Volunteers
Individual volunteers serving in youth activities would be covered by the
statute. The term "volunteer" should be broadly defined. Thus, for example,
more than a modest gift or honorarium for a coach or other volunteer at the end
of the year or season should be required in order to nullify that person's
volunteer status. The activity or enterprise in question should not necessarily
have to be one devoted exclusively to youth activities. The focus should be on
whether the activity was at least in part provided for the victim's benefit.
Moreover, if an individual provided volunteer youth activities, he should be
able to avail himself of exculpatory agreements notwithstanding the fact that the
sponsoring organization charged for the services or was a profit-making
enterprise.
A question may arise whether the fact that a person has liability insurance
should affect the validity of or limit the scope of the protection otherwise
afforded by an exculpatory agreement. I suggest that it should not. First,
permitting a claim would probably affect the premiums an insured would be
required to pay in the future. Second, recognition of an insurance exception
would add another element of fortuity to the whole matter of how these types
of injuries should be addressed. Third, such a rule would invite litigation on
the matter of the scope of insurance coverage. Such litigation carries inherent
costs. Time and legal energy would have to be expended on these threshold
issues. Even if an insured defendant were protected by insurance, he would still
be subjected to the time-consuming haunting ordeal of litigation, and even if an
uninsured volunteer were protected by an exculpatory agreement, he might still
have to pay substantial attorney fees before the question of his uninsured status
was clarified. Finally, this kind of "deep pocket" exception would serve to
perpetuate a system that, as I have explained, is often indefensibly inefficient,
arbitrary, and counter productive. 317
b. Sponsoring Entities
I think that exculpatory agreements should also be available to the
sponsoring organization providing youth activities if the organization's
involvement in the activity was essentially on a nonprofit basis. 318 Nor should
317 See supra part V.B. 1.b.ii.
318 Organizations and entities qualifying under the proposed statute should include both
governmental organizations and private nonprofit organizations, as well as any other
organization providing youth services gratuitously or at cost. The statute should apply to
any organization or course of operations of an organization conducted to support youth
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it matter, for the purposes of the rule I propose, that a charge was made for the
youth services or for the right to participate in the activity, if those charges
were essentially limited to defraying the costs of the activity. Moreover, I
would allow the exculpatory agreements to bar claims against the sponsoring
organization for both vicarious and direct liability. 3 19
To bar claims against individual volunteers, but permit vicarious liability of
the sponsoring entity would perpetuate many of the problems with liability in
this area. It would not take long for the effects of actual and threatened liability
to put many sponsors of youth activities out of operation, or to set in motion a
series of defense-motivated reactions that would so dilute and distort the
activities in question as to make them worthless. Even if volunteers were not
subject to personal liability, the stifling effects that the specter of liability would
have on the organization would be felt by the volunteers.
Some might contend that protecting the sponsoring organization would be
tantamount to resurrecting charitable immunity. I would rejoin that when the
services are recreational in nature, are free or at least provided at cost, and the
exculpatory agreement was willingly signed, the "immunity" is self-imposed
and just.320
c. Liability Insurers
The general rule is that, unless subject to a special insurance exception, an
immunity that protects an insured against tort liability also protects that
activities on a nonprofit basis. Thus, even a for-profit organization could avail itself of the
statute for operations or projects designed to benefit youth participants and conducted on a
nonprofit basis.
319 Theories of direct liability against the sponsoring organization would be similar to
the theory of corporate negligence asserted against hospitals. See generally KING, supra
note 138, at 304-18. Allegations of direct negligence by the organization that contributed to
an injury of a youthful participant might involve failure to select volunteers properly, failure
to promulgate and disseminate accident-prevention rules, and failure to provide suitable
training and education for its volunteers. The problem here, of course, is that virtually any
injury to a participant can, in retrospect, be perceived as a: failure of the sponsoring
organization. In most cases, any real control by a national organization over activities at the
local level is simply illusory. And to demand any such control is unrealistic.
320 See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). Reliance on
the Tunkl case is misplaced. The Tunkl case held that an exculpatory agreement that
otherwise violated public policy was not rendered valid merely because the services in
question were free. Tunkl is distinguishable because it was decided solely on public policy
grounds applicable to the nature of the services-therapeutic medical services. The court
rejected the argument that an otherwise invalid exculpatory agreement could be rendered
valid merely because the services were free. Here, we do not have an agreement that was,
due to the essential nature of the services, otherwise invalid on public policy grounds.
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person's liability insurer.321 Of course, if a court or statute held that one's
immunity were abrogated to the extent that one carried liability insurance, then
the insurance company would not be protected from suit. The reason would not
be that there was insurance, but that the underlying immunity had to that extent
been abrogated. In the case of valid exculpatory agreements in favor of
volunteers (and not-for-profit sponsoring entities), the mere fact that a
volunteer had some personal insurance (or even was provided liability
insurance by an institutional sponsor of the activity) should not alone, under
my proposal, forfeit protection provided by the exculpatory agreement. 322 And
therefore, any liability insurer that insured a volunteer or the sponsoring
nonprofit organization should be entitled to the same defenses available to the
insured, including any protection afforded by a valid exculpatory agreement.
4. Claims of Third Parties
An exculpatory agreement that barred a claim by the victim should also bar
derivative claims. Because the courts have not always agreed on the effect that
various defenses applicable to a victim may have on claims by others arising
from the fact of the tortious injury to the victim, this rule should be expressly
adopted by statute. Thus, if a young person participating in an activity was
precluded from pursuing a negligence claim against a volunteer and sponsoring
organization, his parents323 should likewise be precluded from asserting claims
for loss of services, medical expenses, and any other claims related to the fact
of the original injury. 324 Claims under wrongful death or survival acts should
also be subject to preclusion under an exculpatory agreement.325 Claims for
321 KEErON & WIDISS, supra note 83, at 385; see, e.g., Trainor v. Azlatan Cycle
Club, Inc., 432 N.W.2d 626, 632-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (valid exculpatory agreement
also precluded claim against protected defendants' liability insurers).
322 See, e.g., Trainor, 432 N.W.2d at 632-33.
323 See generally KEErON Er AL., supra note 1, § 125, at 937. These claims may
themselves be subject to the express language of the exculpatory agreement to the extent
that a parent-claimant signed the agreement. Under my proposal, however, the derivative
claims of parents would be barred irrespective of whether or not the particular parent in
question signed the agreement if the agreement otherwise barred the claim by the accident
victim himself. Thus, if one parent signed the agreement, it would be effective against the
derivative claims of the other parent.
324 Claims for loss of consortium should also be precluded. See generally KEETON Er
AL., supra note 1, § 125, at 937-39. Some cases have held that such claims were not
precluded by an exculpatory agreement signed by the injured person. See Dobratz v.
Thompson, 455 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 468
N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1991). Therefore, the application of the agreement to consortium claims
should be expressly addressed by statute.
325 See generally Winkler v. Kirkwood Atrium Office Park, 816 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1991) (wrongful death and survival actions barred); Dobratz v. Thompson, 455
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negligent infliction of mental distress based on a person's observation or
perception of the injury to the victim326 should also be barred by a valid
exculpatory agreement barring the victim himself. Moreover, all derivative
claims and other claims of third parties, including claims for loss of services,
medical expenses, loss of consortium, wrongful death, and survival claims
should be barred by an otherwise valid exculpatory agreement even if the
claimant, such as a parent, did not explicitly release his or her own claim.
Claims for contribution or indemnity against persons protected by an
exculpatory agreement should also be precluded. 327 Thus, if a child is injured
by a defectively designed piece of sporting equipment and sues the product
manufacturer, that manufacturer should have no claim for contribution or
indemnity against the coach based on allegations of negligent inspection of the
equipment, if the child's tort claim against the coach was precluded by a valid
exculpatory agreement. The only possible exception should arise when the
party otherwise protected by an exculpatory agreement had expressly agreed to
indemnify the third party indemnitee.
5. Duration of Coverage of the Agreement
An exculpatory agreement that covers conduct should bar a claim no matter
when that claim is asserted. The question is during what period of time will the
agreement cover conduct so as to bar future claims based on that conduct that
occurs during that covered period. In other words, what is the duration of the
coverage of the agreement? Ideally, the parties should spell out the period of
time during which the conduct contemplated by the agreement will be covered
by the agreement. A question may arise, however, when the document is silent
as to its duration of coverage. The preferable approach would be to hold that
when the agreement specifies no definite period of coverage, it is terminable at
the will of either party as to future injurious conduct, but otherwise should
continue to apply to future conduct until either party expressly terminates it.328
N.W.2d 639 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (wrongful death claim barred) rev'd on other grounds,
468 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1991); KEErON Er AL., supra note 1, § 127, at 954-55; supra note
148; see also Madison v. Sup. Ct., 250 Cal. Rptr. 299, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (wrongful
death claim not barred by decedent's release of such claim, but was barred by effect of
exculpatory agreement relieving defendants of duty).
326 See generally P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence
for Fear of Injury to Another, or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Sud Injury, 29
A.L.R.3D 1337 (1970). There is little law on exculpatory agreements in this context.
327 See Wilson v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 228, 232 (M.D.
Pa. 1988) (applying Pa. law) (explaining that otherwise such claims "would subvert the
purpose of exculpatory provisions").
328 See generally Bien v. Fox Meadow Farms, Ltd., 574 N.E.2d 1311 (111. App. Ct.
1991).
[Vol. 53:683
19921 EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS FOR VOLUNTEERS
VII. CONCLUSION
Volunteers are essential to our national vitality and well-being. The
importance of volunteers in youth activities looms especially large today.
Sponsors of various recreational activities have frequently required participants
to execute exculpatory agreements prior to engaging in the activities. Such
agreements typically purport to release prospectively such sponsors, their
employees, and often their volunteer helpers, from tort liability for negligence.
Following an injury, however, participants injured in the activities, or their
survivors, are often quick to challenge the validity of these releases, relying on
a host of legal arguments. The time has come for state legislatures to approve
the use of exculpatory agreements executed on behalf of minor participants in
youth activities which bar tort claims against volunteers and nonprofit
organizations that provide such services. Unless the growing threat to
volunteers of tort liability, both real and perceived, is effectively extinguished,
we face the prospects of an inexorable flight of volunteers from the domain of
youth activities. The consequences for a society of fractured families, alienated
young people, rabid materialism, and intractable budget deficits are
incalculable.

